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HISTORY OF FLORIDA OIL SPILL LEGISLATION
DAVID

A.

BARRETT* AND CHRISTINE M. WARREN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Prelude to Legislation
On March 19, 1967, the Liberian tanker, Torrey Canyon, ran
aground on the Scillies, just outside the English Channel., The
stricken tanker spewed forth tons of oil that gathered to form a massive
slick eighteen miles long and three miles wide.2 Frantic British and
French authorities searched futilely for effective cleanup methods; their
efforts, judged by present standards, seem to have been a comedy of
errors. Over $16,000,000 was spent on intensive cleanup operations. 3
Royal Air Force bombers sought to set fire to the slimy residue; tons
of detergent were thrown on the waters. More than half of the
$16,000,000 was used to clean up the cleanup, hay and sawdust were
spread on the sea to soak up the oil, then stacked on the beach for an
4
incoming tide to carry out again.
Whatever the myriad mistakes of the English and French seaside
janitors, the effect of the massive spill on the public was electric.
Worldwide media, particularly the English speaking media, gave the
disaster front-page headlines. With such coverage of the disaster, public
and legislative concern over the possibility of similar disasters became
newsworthy. 5
The full environmental horror of oil pollution struck Florida in
Tampa Bay with devastating force on February 13, 1970. That Friday,
the Greek tanker, Delian Apollon, en route to Florida Power Corporation docks, ran aground not far from her destination. Thousands of
barrels of thick "Bunker C" oil, products of Humble Oil Company,
*

B.A., University of South Florida, 1969; J.D., Florida State University, 1973; mem-

ber of The Florida Bar; senior partner, Barrett, Boyd & Holder, Tallahassee, Florida;

formerly Executive Assistant to A.H. "Gus" Craig, Speaker Pro Tern, Florida House of
Representatives. The author was the Staff Director for the Select Committee on Oil

Spill Legislation during the 1974 Florida Legislative Session.
*0 B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975. The author is a
third-year law student at Florida State University.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1967, at 79, col. 6.
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1967, at 9, col. 1.
3.

Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Discharge of Oil from

Vessels on the Navigable Waters of the United States: A Survey, 4 J. MAR. L. AND COMM.
25, 27 (1972).
4. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1967, at 5, col. 1.
5. See The Japan Times, Mar. 26, 1967, at 2, col. 3; The Guardian (Manchester,
G.B.), Mar. 20, 1967, at 1, col. 4; The Times (London), Mar. 20, 1967, at 1, col. 3; The
Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1967, at A-3, col. 1.
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gushed from the hole in the tanker's port side.6 The resulting slick
covered twenty-five square miles of Tampa Bay; 7 its initial cleanup
took four weeks" and cost $93,000. 9 The resulting news coverage was
extensive and statewide.10
Legal action began immediately. Attorney General Earl Faircloth
filed a $200,000,000 suit against Shipping Development Corporation of
Panama, the owner of the Delian Apollon, on February 16, 1970; 1"
later Humble Oil Company, the charterer of the Delian Apollon, and
Florida Power Corporation, the receiver of the oil, joined as interven12
ing plaintiffs.
The effects of the spill were not limited to the costs of cleanup,
news coverage, and a lawsuit. The spill generated interest throughout
the state; it became an example to Florida residents of what could
happen in any bay or along any waterfront. Since the multibilliondollar tourist industry is Florida's lifeblood and Florida's main tourist
attraction is its hundreds of miles of beaches,' 3 the state's interest in its
environment was not without its pragmatic economic overtones. Consequently, the fouling of a rich tourist area by the oil from the Delian
Apollon precipitated considerably more than rhetoric in a comparatively
short period of time.

6. St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
7. Id.
8. See memorandum from Randolph Hodges to Vincent D. Patton (Mar. 31, 1970
reporting the cumulative damage figures from the Tampa Bay spill as of that date.
Many of the letters, reports, miscellaneous publications, and drafts of legislation documented in this article are materials used by the Florida House of Representatives Ad
Hoc [later Select] Committee on Oil Spill Legislation during hearings in 1973 and
1974. These materials are available through the Florida Legislative Library Service
Tallahassee, Florida. Materials located in the committee files will be documented as
[Comm. file].
9. Id. Florida Department of Natural Resources (DNR) expenses: $45,057.90; local
government expenses: $44,114.80; Florida Department of Air and Water PollutiOn"Control
expenses: $3,032.22. Letter from Walter E. Starnes, Air and Water Pollution Control;
to Harmon Shields, Director, Division of Marine Resources, Florida Department of
Natural Resources (Dec. 9, 1970) [Comm. file].
10. See, e.g., The Miami Herald, Feb. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 6; St. Petersburg Times,
Feb. 14-28, 1970; Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
11. State v. M/V Delian Appollon & Shipping Development Corp., S.A., No. 70-74
(M.D. Fla. 1970).
12. Id. The suit was later settled for $150,000 plus interest, costs, disbursements, and
attorney's fees.
13. The Florida Department of Commerce estimates that over 23,000,000 tourists
in Florida in 1970 spent more than $3,600,000,000 while visiting the state. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FLORmA TOUrsT STUDY (1970) (not paginated) [Comm. file]. -The
same study indicates that 67% of tourists sampled in 1970 listed the beaches as Florida's
main attraction.
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1970 Legislative Action

When the 1970 Florida Legislature convened for its sixty-day
session on April 7,14 only six weeks after the Tampa Bay spill, government action to prevent spills and to punish their perpetrators was
imminent. The first oil spill legislation was formally introduced on
April 7, 1970; it required a report of an oil spill by any person
responsible for the discharge and imposed criminal penalties on the
perpetrator of such spills. 15 Several bills were proposed, all differing
widely in penalties and definitions.' 6 At least one bill was touted as
part of Governor Claude Kirk's 1 "get tough" legislative program.',
A committee substitute for one of the bills eventually became law. 19
The toughest aspect of the new law made the spillor absolutely
liable for all costs of cleanup and damages.20 The law provided for no
limitation of liability for those responsible for oil spills. All terminal
facilities and vessels were required to establish and maintain evidence
21
of an ability to meet the financial responsibility imposed by the law.
Once such information was filed, the state was given the right to file a
claim for the costs of cleanup and damages against the insurer, a bond
posted by an owner or operator, or any other person providing a
22
terminal facility or vessel with evidence of financial responsibility.
Procedurally, the law subjected terminal facilities to a regulatory
and licensing system.2 3 The law required licensing under the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) of all terminal facilities24 and de-

14. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1 (1970).
15. Id.
16. Seven bills were proposed: four in the House of Representatives-Fla. H.R. 3535,
3652, 3740, and 4909 (1970); and three in the Senate-Fla. S. 434, 450, and 460 (1970).
17. Rep.-1967-71.
18. St. Petersburg Times, Apr. 8, 1970, at 11-B, col. 1.
19. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, 1970 Fla. Laws
740 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 376.12 (1975)) [Hereinafter the codified version is
cited as (current version at § 376.12). All references are to FLA. STAT. (1975).]. Senate
Bill 450 was introduced on April 7, 1970, and the Committee on Natural Resources
recommended a committee substitute on May 27. FLA. S. JOUR. 64, 579 (1970). The committee substitute was passed by the Senate and sent to the House, where fourteen amendments were added. Id. at 709; FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1058-59, 1067, 1069, 1170 (1970). The
Senate refused to concur in five of the fourteen amendments; the House receded from
those amendments. FLA. S. JOUR. 775-76, 850 (1970). The bill finally passed both houses
in the waning hours of the 1970 session.
20. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 12, 1970 Fla.
Laws 740 (current version at § 376.12).
21. Id. § 14 (current version at § 376.14(l)).
22. Id. (current version at § 376.14(2)).
23. Id. § 6 (current version at § 376.06).
24. Id.
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fined "terminal facilities" as waterfront or other facilities used for or

25
capable of being used for the storage or transfer of other pollutants.
In order to be licensed, a terminal facility had to show that it had the
equipment to prevent, contain, and remove an oil spill. 20 The law also
created the Florida Coastal Protection Fund, to which were credited
all license fees, fines and other funds accruing to the State under the
Act.2 7 The monies in the Fund were to pay all administrative expenses
of implementing the law28 and to pay for the removal and cleanup
costs of any oil discharge for which the spillor would not take immediate responsibility.DNR was assigned responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of the law in case an oil spill occurred.30 In the event of any
spill, the spillor was required to undertake removal and cleanup to
DNR's satisfaction;2 1 DNR was authorized to assist in the cleanup and
was required to do so if no action had been taken by the spillor or
if the spill was of unknown origin. 2 The Coastal Protection Fund was
designed to cover immediate expenses, but DNR was then required to
seek reimbursement to the Fund of costs of cleanup and damages to
either the State or any injured party from the perpetration of the
spill.23 Because the law imposed absolute liability on the perpetrator, 34 to seek reimbursement DNR had only to prove the fact of the
discharge, the resulting monetary loss, and the spill source. 5 Only
with DNR approval after a hearing were the four traditional common
law admiralty defenses available: (1) an act of war, (2) an act of God,
(3) an act of government, or (4) an act or omission of a third party.30
Industry's reaction to the proposed bill was slight, but in the pre-

25. Id. § 3 (current version at § 376.031(9)). "Pollutants" was defined as any form
of oil, gasoline, pesticides, ammonia, chlorine or other hazardous substances. Id. (current
version at § 376.031(8)). A subsequent opinion by Attorney General Robert Shevin held
that the term "pollutants" includes any elements or compounds which, when discharged in any quantity into state waters, present an imminent and substantial danger
to the public health and welfare. Even fresh water dumped into salt water in sufficient
quantity to affect marine life could be construed as a pollutant. [1973] FLA. ATr'v. GEN.
ANN. REP. 730.
26. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 6, 1970 Fla.
Laws 740 (current version at § 376.06(6)).
27. Id. § 11 (current version at § 376.11).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 5 (current version at § 376.051).
31. Id. § 8 (current version at § 376.09).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 11 (current version at § 376.11).
34. Id. § 12 (current version at § 376.12).
35. Id.
36. Id.§ 11 (current version at § 376.12(4)).
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vailing atmosphere, even vigorous industry opposition probably would
have been ineffective.37 The oil company inaction was due to administrative structure rather than to any political reason. The marketing branches of Exxon, Gulf, and Shell oil companies were apprised
of the impending legislation. The intrafirm communication was
vertical, not horizontal, however, and the marketing branches failed
to confer with their respective marine transport companies, even
though the shipping sections of the oil industry were those most
directly affected by the proposed bill. Thus, no expert industry
representatives were available to testify during the committee hearings on the bill in the spring of 1970.38
This same lack of intrafirm communication crippled industry
lobbyists, for they lacked their most effective legislative tool: properly
disseminated technical information. To compound this problem, no
well-developed expertise was available to the legislature in the field
of admiralty or federal maritime pollution law. The 1970 Florida law
imposed unlimited liability for damage from oil spills, unlike either
40
federal maritime law 39 or international conventions and treaties.
The result was a bill with which Florida industry could not live.
C.

Industry Reaction: to the Courts

Once the 1970 Oil Spill Law was passed, industry reacted to its
failure to monitor the legislature adequately during the Act's passage.
Less than nine months after the Oil Spill Law took effect, 41 but before
aiy administrative regulations were implemented, the American Waterways 'Operators, joined by several other transport and terminal
facility firms, 4 2 filed suit in American Waterways Operators, Inc. v.
37. Chris Jensen, chief legislative liason for the Florida Petroleum Council, expressed
the -thought that public opinion was so strongly against the oil and shipping industry
that no industry lobbying could have counteracted it. Author's interview with Chris
Jensen, Executive Director and Chief Legislative Liason for the Florida Petroleum Council
(April, 1970).
38. Id.
39. See Section III-B infra.
40. See Section III-D infra for a discussion of the international conventions.
41.
The act went into effect July 1, 1970. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution
Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 24, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
42. The plaintiffs represented both Florida and international interests. The plaintiffs
were the American Waterways Operators, Inc.; Gulf Atlantic Towing Corporation;
Glidden-Durkee, a division of SCM Corporation; Dixie Carriers, Inc.; Oil Transport
Co.; National Marine Service, Inc.; the Revilo Corporation; Eastern Seaboard Petroleum
Company; Nilo Barge Line, Inc.; Steuart Transportation Company; Interstate Oil Transport Company; Federal Barge Lines, Inc.; Gulf Canal Lines, Inc.; and Ingram Ocean
System, Inc. Complaint, American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp.
1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971) [hereinafter Complaint].
In addition, the intervening plaintiffs were Suwanee Steamship Company; Coin-
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4s

In their complaint, the original plaintiffs alleged that the Florida
law was unconstitutional and unenforceable 44 and sought either to
enjoin the statute's enforcement or to have it declared unconstitutional.4' The complaint was based on four federal constitutional
grounds: 1) the commerce clause; 2) the federal judicial power in
admiralty and maritime law; 3) the due process clause; and 4) the
46
supremacy clause.
The plaintiffs alleged that Florida's statute burdened interstate
commerce in several ways. First, plaintiffs argued that Congress had
preempted the field of preventive safeguards, notice, penalties, cleanup,
and reimbursement by enacting the Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970;47 therefore the Florida law allegedly placed an additional
and undue burden on interstate commerce." Second, the plaintiffs
urged, the Florida Act allowed a maze of local, county, and state
regulations; if such regulations were ever enacted, the requirement to
comply with them could also burden interstate commerce.4 9 The
plaintiffs claimed that the resulting difficulty in operating their
businesses would constitute a taking of property and a destruction of
business. 50
The Florida Act required the shipping companies to show that
they were financially able to meet the liability limits imposed by the
Act before being allowed to operate in ports under the state's .jurisdic-

modores Point Terminal Corporation; American Institute of Merchant Shipping;
Assuranceforeningen Gard, Assuranceforeningen Skuld; the Brittannia Steam Ship Insurance Association, Ltd.; the Japan Ship Owners Mutual Protecting and Indemnity
Association, Ltd.; the Liverpool and London Steam Ship Protection and Indemnity
Association, Ltd.; the London Steamship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association, Ltd.;
Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association; The North of England Protecting and
Indemnity Association, Ltd.; The Standard Steamship Owners' Protection and Indemnity
Association, Ltd.; the Standard Steamship Owners' Protection and Indemnity Association
(Bermuda), Ltd.; The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Ltd.; Sunderland
Steamship Protecting and Indemnity Association; Sueriges Angfartygs Assuranceforening;
the United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance Association (Bermuda), Ltd.; the
West of England Ship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg); and their respective members. Complaint of Intervening Plaintiffs, American
Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
43. 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 325 (1973). The original
complaint was filed March 11, 1971.
44. Complaint at 2.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id. at 2.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1151-1175 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (Supp. 11 1972)).
48. Complaint at 7.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
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tion. 51 The companies alleged that it was impossible to obtain insurance
to meet the requirements of the Florida Act because it imposed an
unlimited liability for all damages incurred by anyone. 5 2 As a result, the
plaintiffs claimed they might not be able to do business in Florida
ports.58
The plaintiffs claimed that the Florida Act presumed to have jurisdiction over cases properly adjudicated under admiralty and maritime
law in violation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.5 4 Plaintiffs also claimed the Act imposed liability potentially
greater than that allowed by the Federal Limitation of Vessel Owner's
55
Liability Act.
The complaint alleged a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The Florida
Act allegedly did not specifically provide notice to those responsible for
a pollutant discharge before the state moved to clean up a spill,' 6 nor
did it provide a defendant any opportunity to be heard when the
state authorities were determining liability. 7 Only after the defendant
had been determined to be liable were the four common law defenses
available.58 Even then the defenses could be raised only at the discretion of the state authorities.5 9
Claiming further lack of due process, the plaintiffs alleged that
the administrative findings by the state were "conclusive. ' 6' 0 The
plaintiffs maintained that the state was under no obligation to adjudicate its claims in any court, 61 and that no in-court hearing to assess a
penalty was required. 62 DNR had the power to assess a civil penalty of
up to $50,000 for each day of the offense without a court hearing and
without any enumerated guidelines by which to set the penalty;
plaintiffs claimed these provisions violated both procedural and sub-

51. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 14, 1970 Fla.
Laws 740 (current version at § 576.14).
52. Complaint at 12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 11; see 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
56. Id. at 9; see The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244,
§ 9, 1970 Fla. Laws 740 (current version at § 376.11).
57. Complaint at 9; see The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch.
70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740 (current version at § 376.11).
58. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
59. Id.
60. Complaint at 9-10; See The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch.
70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740 (cutrrct version at § 376.11).
61. Complaint at 10,
62. Id.
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stantive due process rights. 63 Throughout the complaint, whenever a
difference between the federal and state statutes existed, the plaintiffs
claimed that the Florida statute violated the supremacy clause.64
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida granted a temporary injunction against the enforcement of
the law on March 19, 1971.65 On December 10, 1971, Judge Gerald
Tjoflat declared the law unconstitutional.6 6 Florida Attorney General
Robert Shevin promptly appealed the decision. In the interim legislators attempted several times to study and revise the emasculated
statute.6 7 On each occasion, Shevin intervened to ask that legislation
on the matter not be pursued because subsequent legislation might
jeopardize the appeal of the case. 68 The legislature accepted this argument, agreeing to wait until the United States Supreme Court ruled.
In April, 1973, a unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed
the lower court decision. 69
D.

Prelude to Change

In response to the Court's ruling, several members of the Florida
House of Representatives suggested to House Speaker Terrell
Sessums7° that it would be appropriate to appoint a committee to
study possible revision of the oil spill laws. Sessums appointed an
Ad Hoc Committee on Oil Spill Legislation to be chaired by Representative A. H. "Gus" Craig. 71 The Ad Hoc Committee was changed in
October, 1973, to a Select Committee, giving it the power to subpoena
witnesses.7 2 Representative Craig began to hold hearings on the law

63. Id. at 10; see The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, §
16, 1970 Fla. Laws 740 (current version at § 376.06).
64. Complaint at 7, 13, and 15.
65. 335 F. Supp. at 1251.
66. Id. at 1250-51.
67. See Fla. S. 342 and 839 (1971) introduced by Senator Ray C. Knopke (Dem.Temple Terrace). FLA. S. JOUR. 27, 141 (1971).
68. See Hearing on Fla. Stat. ch. 376 Before the Senate Commerce and Natural Resources Committees 31 (Aug. 1973) [hereinafter Aug. 1973 Hearing] (testimony of Jack
Lee) [Comm. file].
69. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (opinion
by Justice Douglas). See Section IV infra.
70. Dem.-Tampa.
71. Rep. Craig (Dem.-St. Augustine) had served two terms as the chairman of
the House Committee on Natural Resources, and was at that time Speaker Pro Tem.
of the Florida House of Representatives.
72. See Memorandum from Terrell Sessums to Gus Craig (Oct. 29, 1973) [Comm.
file]. See also Memorandum from A.H. Craig to Terrell Sessums (Nov. 2, 1973) discussing the best way to report the change in status of the committee so as to encouragq
the participation of witnesses -without -resort to the subpoena-power [Comm. file].
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during the 1973 session, but the first hearings brought only limited
appearances from industry. It was not until August, 1973, when the
onerous effects of the law began to be felt that a concerted effort was
mounted to change the law. Calls for a special session came from
Jacksonville and Pensacola 7 3 where major industries began to feel the
weight of the 1970 legislation. 7 Aside from the objections raised to
the law on the basis of its incongruity with federal standards, the
major problem with the legislation was the unlimited and absolute
75
liability imposed on a spillor for costs and damages of an oil spill.
The immediate tangible effect of this provision was that the plaintiffs

in the litigation and almost all businesses engaged in shipping any
sort of pollutant were unable to obtain insurance to respond to any
potential liability under the 1970 law. 7 6 Thus, shippers were forced
to comply with the financial responsibility section of the statute by
becoming self-insurers for at least part of the liability and by pledging
77
all of their firms' assets to remedy possible spills.

In many cases, this massive incurrence of liability by a shipper
entering Florida waters had ripple effects that were highly detrimental
to the public interest: shippers refused Florida business or required
their Florida contractees to hold the shipper harmless for any spills

occurring in Florida waters.78 For publicly-owned Florida utilities, this
73. The Jacksonville and, Pensacola harbors are the two major Florida ports closest
to out-of-state harbors. Shippers with contracts to deliver in those areas could go to
ports in other states without the same legal consequences. Thus, the harbors at Jacksonville and Pensacola felt the economic impact of the 1970 law-shippers avoiding their
docks-before other Florida ports did. See Aug. 1973 Hearing, supra note 68, at 27-30
(testimony of Jack Lee).
74. See Aug. 1973 Hearing, supra note 68, at 3-4 (remarks of Sen. Lew Brantley
(Dem.-Jacksonville)); St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 2, 1973, at 14-B, col. 2.
75. See Hearing Before Ad Hoc Oil Spill Legislation Comm. of the Florida House
of Representatives (Oct. 11, 1973) [hereinafter Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing] (testimony of
Floyd T. Syrcle, Manager of Safety and Environmental Affairs for Belcher Oil Co.;
testimony of Captain George V. Larimer, President of Sun Transport, Inc., a subsidiary
of Sun Oil Co.; testimony of R.A. Pierpont, Jr., Manager of Wholesale Fuels Business
of Exxon Co., U.S.) [Comm. file].
76. Id.
77. In the complaint in American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F.
Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971), the plaintiffs alleged that it was "necessary under the State Act
that they jeopardize their entire assets to comply, with the demands of this one state."
Complaint at 12. The plaintiffs also alleged that a nonjudicial state agency had the
authority to determine liability without considering any defenses, and that this "resulted in plaintiffs' inability to induce brokers representing insurance and bonding
companies to write bonds or insurance for plaintiffs as contemplated by the State Act."
Id. at 12-13.
78. See Aug. 1973 Hearing, supra note 68, at 26-30 (testimony of Jack Lee
concerning letters he had received from fuel companies explaining why they had not
bid for the contracts to supply fuel to Jacksonville Elcctric Authority). See. also answers
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meant that liability for spilling no longer rested with the shipper
but, by the terms of the contract, upon the utility's owners-the taxpaying public.79
Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC) was confronted with this
situation in July, 1973. New England Petroleum Company (NEPCO),
the firm under contract to provide OUC fuel for electric generation,
threatened to use its contract termination option unless OUC:
1) posted evidence of financial responsibility in the sum of
$3,000,000 to cover NEPCO's barges that delivered OUC's oil to Port
Canaveral;
2) agreed to indemnify and hold NEPCO and its related companies
harmless for all liabilities and expefses resulting from the 1970 Florida
Oil Spill Law and not covered by NEPCO's marine liability insurance;
and
3) agreed to provide the same services for any firms with which
NEPCO might need to make similar arrangements in the course of
80
fulfilling its contract.
These precautions were required by NEPCO even though its
vessels carried $14,000,000 in pollution liability insurance for costs
of cleanup in conformity with federal statutes, and even though it
subscribed to the Tanker Owner's Voluntary Agreement regarding
Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), a voluntary liability agreement for the same purpose."' Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA) and
other publicly-owned utilities were faced with similar dilemmas8 2
In August, 1973, Senator Lew Brantley, Chairman of The Senate
Commerce Committee, and Senator W.D. Childers, Chairman of the
Senate Natural Resources Committee, 3 began holding joint hearings
of their committees on the modification of the 1970 Oil Spill Law. At
the first meetings, held in Jacksonville and attended by members of
to questionnaires received by the Ad Hoc Comm. on Oil Spill Legislation from various
utility and oil companies concerning their difficulties in receiving oil shipments.
79. See Aug. 1973 Hearing, supra note 68, at 11 (testimony of Hans Tanzler, Mayor
of Jacksonville, Florida).
80. OUC complied with the terms. See Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75 (testimony of B.E. Shoup, representing the Orlando Utilities Commission, including the July
10, 1973 telegram from New England Petroleum Corporation signed by Robert Gamble).
81. Id.
82. See Aug. 1973 Hearing, supra note 68, at 104-12 (testimony of Robert Keuther
of the Jacksonville Electric Authority). See also letter from Richard E. Weinand, Vice
President, New England Petroleum Corporation, to J.D. Hicks, Vice PresidentCorporations, Tampa Electric Company, dated July 3, 1973, concerning the oil purchase
contracts between New England Petroleum Corp. and Western Fuels, Inc., and between
Western Fuels, Inc., and Tampa Electric Company [Comm. file].
83. Dem.-Pensacola. Senators Brantley and Childers represented the two areas first
affected. by. the 1970 Oil Spill. Law.
:.
I.
. . -_ ..
- .
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the sponsoring Senate committees as well as by several House members
and their staff, testimony was presented by officials from the state,

federal, and local levels."'
The testimony indicated some of the problems created by the 1970
Oil Spill Law. Jacksonville Mayor Hans Tanzler and several officials
of JEA testified about the details of JEA's fuel procurement problems.
JEA had been able to procure only one bid for generating fuel, and
that bid was double the price paid prior to implementation of the 1970
law. The bidder had specified the Florida Oil Spill Law as the reason
for increasing its price. 85 Further testimony revealed that the Monsanto
Corporation of Pensacola had experienced significant difficulty in
inducing independent barge transports to enter Florida ports.8 8
The House Ad Hoc Committee Hearings in September generated
significantly greater interest and participation than had the August
Senate committee hearings. In the meeting on September 11, the House
committee members began to analyze the 1970 statute and its effects.""
This September hearing began the long, difficult process of proposal,
counter-proposal, and conciliation of widely divergent interests. Before
the Committee met for the last time, it had considered over 100 hours
of testimony, most of a highly technical nature in one field or another.88 As the 1970 law was implemented, an increasing number of
interests began to exert pressure to change the law. The Committee
was faced with a balancing act: it was politically inexpedient to repeal

84. See Aug. 1973 Hearing,supra note 68.
85. See id. at 7-25. JEA had offered invitations to bid "to some of the thirty largest
distributors of oil in the world." When only one submitted a bid, JEA solicited comment
from the companies that declined to bid. The comments indicated that the companies
refused to risk additional liability by shipping fuel to Florida. Id. at 11.
86. See id. at 63 (testimony of Daniel S. Dearing, Ass't Attorney General, State of
Fla.); id. at 135-43 (statement of Jim Snyder, Ass't Plant Manager of Monsanto Textile
Plant, Pensacola, Florida).
87. See Hearing Before Ad Hoc Oil Spill Legislation Comm. of the Florida House of
Representatives [hereinafter Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing] [Comm. file].
88. Meetings were held September 11, 1973; October 11, 1973; November 26, 1973; and
January 28, 1974. The purpose of the September II, 1973, meeting was to review the
legal structures of oil spill legislation on international, national, and state levels, and
the administrative and industrial implementation of these laws. See schedule for Sept.
11, 1973, Meeting of Ad Hoc Oil Spill Legislation Comm. of the Florida House of
Representatives [Comm. file]. At the October 11, 1973, meeting, the Ad Hoc Committee
members heard from all persons with statements about the economic and environmental
effects of oil spills, and the industrial effects of the Florida Oil Spill Law. See Agenda,
Ad Hoc Comm. on Oil Spill Legislation, Oct. 11, 1973 [Comm. file]. The testimony at
the November 26 meeting covered the insurance aspects of the Florida Oil Spill Law.
Representatives from throughout the United States and Europe presented their statements. See Agenda, Meeting of Select Comm. on Oil Spill Legislation. On January 28,
1974, the members met to consider the staff proposal for an amended oil spill law.
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the act because Florida's environmental interests 9 and tourism contingencies precluded such an action, yet the 1970 Oil Spill Law had in-

creasingly apparent economic repercussions.
II.

TIME FOR CHANGE

As Section I has illustrated, when the House Committee began
to draft a revision of the 1970 law, it was confronted with a welter of
conflicting interests, facts, and goals. The excerpted testimony indicates the complexity of the situation which a single piece of legislation
was to rectify.
A.

Background To Change

When the 1970 bill was enacted, the public concern about the
environmental impact of an oil spill had generated much political pressure.90 Although public interest in environmental concerns remained
strong, by 1973 environmental issues no longer pervaded the political
atmosphere as greatly as in 1970. The various committees involved
in the 1973 hearings heard and received statements from interest
groups about the ecological effect of an oil spill; 91 a statement by
Michael Stuart, a marine biologist, was representative of environmentally concerned testimony. 92 He reminded the committee members

89. The Florida Defenders of the Environment and the Florida Audubon Society
commissioned Cambridge Survey Research, a research company from Massachusetts, to
do a survey on voter awareness of environmental issues. The research company conducted in-depth interviews with 600 Florida voters in March, 1974. The survey showed
that 48% of the people interviewed favored a strict bill which required shippers to pay
up to one half billion dollars for damages caused by oil spills; only 36% thought that a
strict bill was unreasonable. Fifty-nine percent of the sample thought that environmental
issues were the most significant problems facing the state at that time, whereas only 14%
considered economic problems to be the most pressing. A majority of the sample also
stated that it preferred to support candidates who supported environmental proposals.
The report concluded that "Florida voters are extremely concerned about environmental
problems and hold the coalition of politicians and industry responsible." Report: Cambridge Survey Research at 1-6, released April, 1974 [Comm. file].
In addition, articles and editorials in newspapers indicated public concern with the
intertwining problems of potential oil spills, the energy crisis, and the vision of the
public paying for the environmental havoc wreaked by irresponsible multinational
businesses. See Editorial, On A Platter, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 27, 1974, at 22-A, col.
1; Editorial, Beware of Oil Spill Law Changes, WPLG (Miami, Florida), May 30, 1974,
broadcast at 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. [Comm. file].
90. See Section I-A supra.
91. See Agendas, Ad Hoc Committee on Oil Spill Legislation, September 11, 1973,
supra note 87, and October 11, 1973, supra note 75.
92. Mr. Stuart was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Florida
Audubon Society and Chairman of the Oil Committee of Save Our Bays of Sarasota.
Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75 (testimony of Michael Stuart at 1).
-.
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of the environmental, economic, and aesthetic dangers inherent in oil
spills by stating:
[A]Il crude oils and oil fractions are toxic to marine organisms
except for a few highly refined and purified fractions. In any one
spill the reactions of members of the marine community to this
toxicity may differ from one situation to another, but the potential
for severe kills or the inhibition of normal organismal functions
exists in every spill and because of this the threat of spills should
not be treated lightly.
The spills in Buzzard's Bay, Massachusetts certainly demonstrated
that members of all phyla can succumb to the lethal effects of fuel
oil and that the fuel oil will spread, cause kills at later dates,
cause taste in shell fish, resist decomposition of the most toxic fractions and remain in large quantities as much as 4 years later. No
one knows how long that oil will cause troubles since it has only
been 4 years since the spill and the effects are still noticed. The research in general indicates that refined product spills are usually
[disastrous] 93 and that they are even more dangerous when they occur
in shallow waters.
We shouldn't, however, give crude oil a clean bill of health,
since it contains the fractions that are made in the refining process
plus other dangerous fractions such as the water soluble component.
Numerous water soluble components are very toxic and can be
shown to have very adverse sublethal effects on organisms even when
the components are in very low concentrations. The other low boiling point saturated hydrocarbons found in crude oil pose a threat
to the environment as many are very toxic. The high boiling point
fractions can also be a threat as many of these are carcinogenic.
Nevertheless, in most cases, the pugnacious composition of the
environment and the high reproductive potential of most marine
organisms, will allow the marine community to slowly recover from
a single spill over a period of months or years ....
[However,] it is
the chronic spill problem associated with oil operations that bothers
me as a biologist. Whereas, systems usually recover from single spills
the chronic spill problem, even though each spill may be only a few
barrels, is another problem [altogether] since few systems can recover
if they are constantly exposed. In areas of chronic spills all vegetation
may be destroyed and only the very hardiest species will remain ....
Another perplexing problem is what to do once a spill has
occurred. Research on chemicals that are designed to break up the
oil indicates that the chemicals used are frequently as toxic or more
toxic than the oil itself. In many cases chemical by-products are
93. Typographical errors in the transcription have been corrected and placed in
brackets.
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formed that are also toxic. To date no dispersants have been found
that are non-toxic to all or even most marine organisms. Usually,
then, to clean up after a spill you are left with the pitifully inefficient mechanical methods which may only recover 50% in the
best of conditions. Nature also helps with the clean up, but don't
be [misled], bacterial degradation of oil is by no means complete
and is almost totally inhibited by a lack of oxygen. When plenty
of oxygen is present the bacteria are very selective in their degradation and usually do not touch the most toxic fractions. Without
oxygen, however, little or no decomposition occurs as would be the
case a few inches down in the sand on a beach or in the mud of an
estuarine bay bottom. Here after the first 10% is decomposed the
remaining portion decomposes ['immeasurably slowly'] to quote one
researcher. Truly this becomes a haunted dump, for the toxic elements will be slowly released to the surrounding water perhaps
causing more fish kills after a 'norther' stirs up the bottom or to be
uncovered by [winter] beach erosion only to cause another onslaught
of blackened feet and ruined bathing suits.94
The environmental interest groups stressed constantly to the
committee members the need to emphasize spill prevention and the
need to insure spill prevention by imposing tight regulations. 5 The
Florida Chapter of the Sierra Club heartily endorsed and supported
the unlimited liability provisions of Florida's 1970 statute, stating that
"[i]t is only with such high performance standards that Florida has any
chance to avoid oil-polluted coastal waters." 96 Newspaper and radio
editorials spoke out against any modification of the liability imposed
by the 1970 law.9 7 The general sentiment of these editorials was that
only strict standards would enable those in authority to prevent oil
spills.98
The National Environmental Development Association advocated
a more moderate approach to the 1970 law. This group supported "a
balanced approach to environmental and economic opportunities," 99
94. Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75 (testimony of Michael Stuart at 2-4).
95. See, e.g., Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75 (testimony of Michael Stuart).
96. See Statement, Dr. Shirley Taylor, Executive Committee of the Florida Chapter,
Sierra Club (undated) [Comm. file].
97. See note 89 supra concerning newspaper and radio editorials.
98. But see Editorial, Oil Spill Protection, The Tampa Times, Jan. 18, 1974, at 8A,
col. 1; Editorial, Challenges and Opportunities, The Florida Times-Union, Apr. 2, 1974,
§ A, at 4, col. 1; Editorial, Oil Spill Law Is a Total Failure, Effective One Is Urgently

Needed, Sentinel Star, Apr. 14, 1974; Editorial, The Oil Spill Treadmill, The Florida
Times-Union, Apr. 15, 1974, § A, at 8, col. 1.
99.

Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75

(statement of Riley S. Miles, Chairman,

National Environmental Development Association). The National Environmental Development Association was organized as a non-profit corporation in 1973, with the,.in-
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and asked the Florida legislature to reconsider seriously the unlimited
liability provisions of the 1970 law, suggesting that less stringent
liability provisions would be adequate. The National Environmental
Development Association also posed the questions whether recovery
from an insurance company would be preferable to recovery from a
corporation, and whether the indirect effect of increased energy prices
for the consumer might be more costly than an oil spill. 10 0 These questions were the primary issues the legislative committees entertained
until the 1974 bill was passed.
B.

Oil Spill Damages

In Florida, the fishing and shellfish industries also feel the direct
effect of a spill. Yet the indirect damage that results is even more pervasive. At the October 11, 1973 hearing, Gordon Enk, Director of
Research, Institute on Man and Science, an institute chartered by the
Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, spoke
on the potential damages and cleanup costs resulting from an oil
spill. He presented a concise report of an international symposium,
"The Assessment of Social Impacts of Oil Spills," which had been held
at the Institute of Man and Science in Rensselaerville, New York,
only two weeks earlier.
In his presentation, Enk stressed that the cost of cleaning up an
oil spill is much greater than is usually assumed, varying from $.50
to $15 per gallon of oil, depending on the time of the year, the location of the spill, and the type of oil that has been spilled. But these
costs do not include the injury to fisherman, businessmen, beachfront
residents on private beaches, and vessel owners. Each of these suffers a
financial loss when spilled oil begins to coat the water and beaches,
killing fish and sending tourists to other resort areas.
Enk presented an estimate showing losses from spills. Estimated
losses from incidents in Japan in the 1950's ranged from $600 to
$118,000. Recent spills in the United States were estimated to have
resulted in losses reaching $15,000,000. A spill in a highly populated
area would cause tremendous recreation losses. Assuming that the
value of one man-use day of recreation was worth $1.50, an oil spill
in Long Island Sound would result in damages of $30,000,000; the
damages of a spill in Los Angeles would be $51,000,000.
tention "to find a middle ground . . . a balance between environmental progress and
economic progress." Statement by Kenneth J. Bousquest, Executive Vice President of
National Environmental Development Association and by Thomas A. Young, President
(undated) [Comm. file].
100. Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing,supra note 75 (statement of Riley S. Miles).
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These figures estimated losses only to the recreation industry. A
complete assessment of the net cost of an oil spill to an area would add
to the immediate expense of cleanup and recreation loss, the cost of
community disruption, private losses, and aesthetic degradation. As
Gorden Enk pointed out, the total cost would be "orders of magnitude
higher" than the original estimates.''
The sheer volume of oil and oil products shipped by sea makes
the potential level of oil pollution immense. 10 2 Some statistics about the
size and future size of oil tankers were available to the Committee.
In 1972, the shipping industry had tankers in service of 326,000 dead
weight tons (DWT) and at least one tanker of 366,800 DWT. Even
larger tankers were being constructed and delivered; at the time, a
447,000 DWT tanker was being built in Japan and orders had been
10 3
placed in France for two tankers of 540,000 DWT each.
The actual amount of oil products shipped through Florida waters
was not as well known. 0 4 Eventually, information revealed that tanker
and barge movements of crude oil and petroleum products from the
United States Gulf Coast to the East Coast, requiring traffic near and
into Florida waters, averaged 1.612 million barrels daily in 1972.105

101. Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75.
102. [B]etween 1938 and 1967 world production of oil increased nearly seven times,
from 278 million tons per year to 1,828 million tons. In 1967 it was estimated that
more than 700 million tons of this annual production were being transported by
sea.
Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 316, 317 (1969) (citations omitted).
103. 3 Exxon Background Series, Safer Tankers and Cleaner Seas, at 5 (Nov. 1972)
[Comm. file].
104. Part of a major shipping lane from South America and the Panama Canal to
Europe and the east coast of the United States passes through Florida waters. Reasonably
reliable statistics of the amount of oil products entering Florida's territorial waters
were, and are, probably impossible to calculate.
Chris Jensen, Executive Director of the Florida Petroleum Council, reminded the Oil
Spill Committee members of Florida's dependency on petroleum: 71% of Florida's energy
in 1971 was supplied by oil. In comparison, only 44.4% of the total United States energy
supply came from oil. Mr. Jensen noted that virtually all of Florida's fuel requirements
(oil and coal) arrived by water since Florida had no refineries in 1973 and had to
import many oil products from refining centers outside the state. For the transportation
of the foreign crude oil to the refining centers and of the refined products to the
consumer, suppliers relied on water transportation. Mr. Jensen estimated that 1,100
deliveries by tankers were made to meet Florida's petroleum needs in 1971. The
shallow depths of Florida's harbors (25.5 to 37 feet) limited tanker size to 25,000
DWT. Hearings on Fla. Stat. ch. 376 Before the Natural Resources and Conservation
Committee of the Florida Senate (Sept. 18, 1973) [hereinafter Sept. 18 Hearing] (presentation by Chris Jensen at 1-2 [Comm. file].
105. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REVIEw, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY STATISTICS, 1965-1974, at 46 (May, 1975) [Comm. file].
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In the same year, the Florida ports took in 313,454,843 tons of petroleum and petrol chemicals. 1 6
The Oil Spill Committee was also interested in the number of
pollutant spills in Florida waters and the frequency with which these
spills were reported. 1 7 DNR had been enjoined in May, 1971, from
enforcing the 1970 law; 08 funds for recording spills were not available to DNR. Consequently, DNR did not have precise statistics available for the Committee. The Department provided the oil spill committee with records of the number of spills reported before it was restrained from enforcing the 1970 law, thereby providing the Committee
with a limited indication of the frequency and magnitude of spills in
Florida waters. From July 1, 1970, through September 18, 1970, fiftyone spills, totaling 58,658 gallons, were investigated. 10 9 One oil spill
every seventeen hours was reported to DNR when the 1970 law was
first implemented.11°
The Committee heard the testimony of a representative of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency,"' which monitored
spills in the inland waterways under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act 1 2 and the Refuse Act of 1899."3 That agency provided
spill frequency information to the Oil Spill Committee. The Committee learned that virtually none of the spills- in Florida had been reported to the Environmental Protection Agency from 1971 to 1973;
by contrast, in 1973 in North Carolina, approximately thirty spills
had been reported to that agency each month." 4
The testimony made it clear to the Committee that the amount
of potential pollution and the probable effects of a discharge, whether
large, small, accidental, negligent, or intentional, required some means
of recovery for parties that had suffered injury from that pollution.

106.

See UNITED

STATES

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

WATERBORNE COMMERCE REPORT

1972, at 43-62, 132-145.
107. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing,supra note 87, at 85-126 (presentations by Captain
William Montgomery, Chief of Marine Safety Division, 7th District, United States Coast
Guard, Miami, Florida; Al Smith, Region IV, Environmental Protection Agency, Atlanta,
Georgia; and Harmon Shields, Director, Division of Marine Resources, Florida Department of Natural Resources).
108. The temporary restraining order was issued March 19, 1971, and was made
permanent in the final order in December, 1971. 335 F. Supp. at 1251. See Sept. 11, 1973
Hearing, supra note 87, at 110 (testimony by Harmon Shields).
109. See report from Department of Natural Resources of the total pollutant spills
in Florida from July 1 through September 18, 1970, by area (undated) [Comm. file].
110. Sept.11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 109 (testimony of Harmon Shields).
111. Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 95 (testimony of Al Smith).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975).
-. 113. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
114. Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing,supra note 87, at 97 (testimony of Al Smith).
OF
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In his statement before the Committee, Tom Post, Port Warden of
the Port of Miami, expressed the opinion that the law in its thenexisting state offered few acceptable means of recovery. He gave a
quick overview of the various possible tort causes of action for private
relief, dismissing the usefulness of the torts of trespass, negligence, and
public or private nuisance. 115
Additional testimony outlined the national and international concern over the costs of oil pollution of the oceans; the huge spills of the
late 1960's had prompted many governments to establish programs
to facilitate cleanup processes and to reimburse the cleanup costs."'
Very few of these programs gave compensation for the damage caused
by oil pollution or made provisions for private relief; those that did,
such as the CRISTAL fund and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
11 7
Damage, provided for only limited recovery. ?
The Florida Legislature saw the lack of means of compensation for
damages as an obvious problem. In Florida, where the livelihoods of
many depend on the attractiveness of the beaches and the fertility of
the oceans, a major oil spill could be an economic and environmental
disaster. Florida needed some means of insuring that the individual
would not suffer unduly from some shipping firm's pollution.
Thus the need for an effective bill became clear. There had to
be some means of providing compensation to individuals for pollutant
spill damage. The bill needed not only to encourage but also to require
spill prevention. The bill could not, however, be so stringent as to
cripple Florida business. The 1970 Oil Spill Law had addressed the prevention of oil spills and the compensation of individuals, but it had
failed to meet economic realities.
C.

Concerns of Industry

Pressure for amending the 1970 Oil Spill Law came from a variety
of sources. Several organizations of business, including the National
Federation of Independent Businesses (through Associated Industries
of Florida), Florida Petroleum Council (an affiliate of the American
Petroleum Council), Florida Roofing, Sheet Metal, and Air Conditioning Contractors, and the Florida Chamber of Commerce were heavily
involved in the effort. 118 Individual firms such as Eastern Seaboard
115. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 65-69.
116. For a discussion of these legislative acts, agreements and international conventions, see Sections III-C, D, & E infra.
117. See Sections III-C & D infra for information about these funds.
118. See National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) Special Survey
(1974) [Comm. file]. In this survey, tallied April 26, 1974, the NFIB asked its Florida
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Petroleum Company, Belcher Oil, Western Fuels of Tampa, Gulf, and
Exxon expressed their opinions"119 and made their expertise available.
In addition to these efforts, Governor Reubin Askew and several
Florida cabinet members, notably Attorney General Robert Shevin,
took extensive interest in the proceedings. The offices of key legislative
leaders were extremely active.
As the hearing progressed, key problems with the 1970 Oil Spill
Law consistently emerged:
lack of a cap on liability, which resulted in:
12°
(a) unavailability of marine pollution insurance;
(b) reluctance or refusal of independent shippers to enter
Florida; 12'
(c) contract stipulations holding shippers harmless for spills
122
and refracting this liability to the product recipient;
(2) the preemption of the four common law tort defenses of act of
war, act of God, act of government, and acts or omission of third
1 23
parties;
(3) the lack of a mechanism whereby private entities could recover
(1)

damages;1 24 and

(4) the absence of an effective method of financing response and
cleanup efforts, much less damages, because the fund created in 1970
1 25
had proven to be totally inadequate.
As early as October the committee staff began developing alternative approaches to the problems outlined. A stumbling block in this
process was that regional and Florida industry spokesmen could not
members to complete a ballot, asking their opinions on several issues. One general
question-"[s]hould Florida modify its present unlimited liability Oil Spill Law?"-elicited
a response in which 62% answered in the affirmative and 28% responded negatively.
See also McCormick, Editorial, FLORIDA FORUM, Official Publication of Florida Roofing,
Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors Association, Feb. 14, 1974, at 3.
119. See Eastern Seaboard Petroleum Company's full page advertisement, It's Too
Late to Cry Wolf, Florida Times-Union, Oct. 9, 1973, at A-19.
120. See Oct. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 75 (testimony by Jim Woodroffe, III,
Assistant Secretary, Tampa Electric Co.; testimony by R.A. Pierpont, Jr., Manager of
Wholesale Fuels Business of Exxon company, U.S.A. at 2).
121. R.A. Pierpont specifically stated that "the Florida Oil Spill Law is creating
extreme difficulties in scheduling ships since charter ships normally used to deliver
products to Florida are increasingly unavailable." Id. (testimony of R.A. Pierpont at 6).
122. See also the statement by Bill Newburn, Sales Manager for Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., a subsidiary of Fruehauf Corporations. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 61-73 (testimony of Tom Post,
Port Warden of the Port of Miami).
125. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87 at 109-26 (testimony of Harmon
Shields, Director, Division of Marine Resources, Florida Department of Natural Resources).
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speedily respond to proposals since the national home offices had to
review and instruct the regional representatives as to appropriate
responses. The Florida Petroleum Council representative, for example,
could not enunciate a formal position on any proposal until a consensus from the entire organization (twelve major oil companies) was
reached. This was understandably a slow process. 126 In addition, during
the time of the committee hearings Florida's Attorney General had
filed a claim of antitrust violations against those entities most affected
by the 1970 Oil Spill Law,'127 including most of the larger shipping
firms.128 The affected entities were apparently rather nervous about
testifying, since their statements could conceivably be used against
them.
It should also be noted that the effects of the law were aggravating
the energy shortage; this resulted in calls for a special session by
several key legislators, among them Senators Russell Sykes,'12 9 W.D.
Childers, Lew Brantley, Senate President Mallory Home, 30 and
Representatives Earl Dixon' and Mary Singleton. 32 However, Committee Chairman Craig and House Speaker Terrell Sessums consistently declined to request the special session.' Even when the legislature convened a special session in January, 1974, to consider changing
to standard time and other energy related matters, the leadership
opposed attempts to expand the purview of the special session to consider oil spill law revision.3 Craig and Sessums feared that a hasty
yes-no vote of the type common in the rush of special sessions would
produce results similar to the 1970 session when the Oil Spill Law was
135
enacted; they wanted no compounding of previous errors.
126. Cf. text accompanying notes 37-40 supra (industry response during 1970 legislative session).
127. This claim was brought as a counterclaim; it was filed on April 21, 1971, by
the defendants in American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241
(M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
128. The counterclaim was brought against the intervening parties plaintiff. See
note 42 supra. Other persons, firms and corporations were alleged to be co-conspirators.
129. Rep.-West Palm Beach.
130. Dem.-Tallahassee.
131. Dem.-Jacksonville.
132. Dem.-Jacksonville.
133. See St. Augustine Record, Sept. 12, 1973 [Comm. file]. See also the report by
Senator Russell Sykes of a telegram to Governor Askew sent on January 16, 1974, urging
the Governor to call a special session to revise the Oil Spill Law. St. Petersburg Times,
Jan. 17, 1974, at 14-B, col. I.
134. See St. Augustine Record, Jan. 29, 1974 [Comm. file].
135. See St. Augustine Record, Nov. 27, 1973, at 7 captioned: "Representative Craig
Remains Opposed to Session on Oil Spill Law." The story stated that Rep. Craig "didn't
want to tinker with the law 'because I'm afraid we won't do a good job for the people!"
[Comm. file].
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1974 Legislation

From October through February the Committee wrote at least
eleven drafts of a proposed oil spill bill, gradually refining its "balancing approach" to oil spill prevention and control. The Coastal Protection Fund grew from merely an administrative source of funds to a
major means of providing immediate satisfaction for claims.1l6 There
were questions whether the transfer of pollutants through underwater
pipelines was a hazardous undertaking. Eventually the phrase "and
through underwater pipelines" was removed from the proposed section
on the legislative intent,'137 which found that transfers of pollutants to,
from, and between terminal facilities were "hazardous undertakings.", 38
Yet, in the final legislation, underwater pipelines were indirectly included in that provision, for they remained in a later section within
the definition of "terminal facilities." x31 A struggle occurred over
defining the transfer of pollutants as a "hazardous" or "ultra-hazardous"
activity. The 1970 law had deemed the transfer of oil a "hazardous"
activity. 140 The initial drafts in 1973 described it as "ultra-hazardous"
but, by February 4, 1974, the transfer of pollutants became "hazardous"
again' 4' and those transferring pollutants were not absolutely liable
for any damages incurred from an oil spill.
Many other provisions were contemplated, discussed, rejected, or
refined. During the deliberations in 1973 and 1974, industry was much
more sensitive than in 1970 to the dynamic processes of legislative
change. Activity from the construction and fuel industries increased.142

-136. Compare The Oil Spill- Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244,

§ 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740 with FLA. STAT.. § 376.11 (1975).
137. See proposed § 376.02(3)(a), Feb. 8, 1974, draft of Select Committee legislation
[Comm. file].
138. See FLA. STAT. § 376.021(3) (a) (1975) (originally enacted as The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 2, 1970 Fla. Laws 740).
139. Id. § 376.031(9) (1975).
140. The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 2, 1970
Fla. Laws 740.
141. Compare the October, 1973, Committee Drafts nos. 65-88a, 65-93, with the
Feb. 4, 1974, Draft [Comm. file].
142. The Florida Petroleum Council, through Executive Director Chris Jensen,
submitted suggested changes in the provisions of the Select Committee's proposed oil
spill bill adopted on February 25, 1974; some of the suggestions were adopted. See Memo
from Chris Jensen to Rep. Gus Craig (undated) [Comm. file]. The Gulf Atlantic
Transport Corporation also sent letters to Senator Brantley and Representative Craig,
expressing the opinion that "for Florida to have an effective oil spill law it should
enact Federal oil cleanup regulations giving the usual natural defenses and eliminating
the other burdensome and conflicting requirements .... ." Letter from H.G. Williams,
Ch'mn, Environmental Control Comm., The American Waterways Operators, Inc. to Sen.
Lew Brantley, at 3 (Jan. 30, 1974) [Comm. file].
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American Waterway Operators submitted a draft bill in October, 1973,
limiting all claims and liabilities to those established by federal act. 143
Exxon also proposed a draft bill in February which significantly affected
the procedural provisions of the bill in its final form. 1 '' Industry was
constantly alert to the possibilities of removing state control over the
transporting of pollutants altogether and hoped to conform the Florida
law to federal standards.

1 45

Senator Lew Brantley and Representative Earl Dixon formally
introduced legislation in April, 1974, which attempted to amend the
1970 Oil Spill Law to conform with federal liability limits. The proposed legislation granted the four common law defenses and limited
liability to $14,000,000 for cleanup costs. 14 6 Since the bills would limit
Florida law to federal specifications, industry seized the opportunity
to encourage their adoption.
On the same day that Senate Bill 132 was introduced in the
Florida Senate, the Senate Committee on Commerce recommended a
committee substitute for the bill and placed it on the Senate calendar. 147 On April 9, 1974, the Senate took up Committee Substitute for
Senate bill 132.148

Several amendments to the committee substitute were then proposed from the Senate floor. An amendment by Senator Brantley was
adopted which deleted the provision for recovery of damages by parties
other than the state injured by an oil spill, leaving recovery only for
the cost of cleanup or other damage incurred by the state up to
$14,000,000."4

Senator Sayler"50 attempted to amend the substitute bill to give
the Department of Natural Resources added enforcement powers, but
his amendment failed. 151 Senator de la Parte 152 substituted a more

limited amendment to the same effect which was adopted. 15

The

143. See House Draft No. 65-89, Oct. 24, 1973 [Comm. file].
144. Compare Exxon Draft Bill with Feb. 4, 1974, and Feb. 22, 1974, Drafts, and
later versions [Comm. file].
145. See note 142 supra.
146. Fla. S. 132 was introduced by Senator Brantley and others on April 2, 1974,
and referred to the Commerce Committee. FLA. S. JouR. 21 (1974). FLA. H.R. 2566'was
introduced by Representative Dixon and others on the same date; it was referred to
the Select Committee and to the Committee on Environmental Protection. FLA. H.R.
JouR. 70 (1974). This bill died in committee.
147. FLA. S. JOUR. 50 (1974).
148. Id. at 95.
149. Id.

150. Rep.-St. Petersburg.
151.
152.
153.

FLA. S. JOUR. 95 (1974).
Dem.-Tampa.
FLA. S. JouR. 95-96 .(1974). The adopted amendment provided that any employee

332

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.5:309

committee substitute was further amended to provide for licensing fees
and for penalties for operation of a terminal facility without a license. 54
An amendment making the operation of a pollutant-carrying vessel
without a certificate of financial responsibility a misdemeanor failed,
as did an amendment making mandatory the collection by the Department of a reasonable fee for the processing and verification of
terminal facility license applications. 55
Senator Saylor attempted to reinstate liability of an owner or
operator for all damages resulting from an oil spill, to any person or
entity, public or private (as opposed to recovery only of the cost of
cleanup incurred by the State), and to allow for recovery against the
Coastal Protection Fund for pollution caused by unknown sources. 1 56
157
Consideration of this amendment was deferred.
On April 15, 1974, House Bill 3388 was introduced in the House
of Representatives and read for the first time by title. The bill was
referred to the Committees on Environmental Protection, Finance and
Taxation, and Appropriations.158 House Bill 3388 was the bill finally
drafted by the Select Committee; its terms expressed the conclusions
of the committee based on hundreds of hours of research and testimony.
The bill added the transfer of pollutants between terminal facilities to
the list of hazardous undertakings set forth in the 1970 Act, 159 but still
referred to pollutant transfer activities as hazardous, rather than ultrahazardous, undertakings.160 Terminal facilities owned and operated by
governmental entities acting as agents of public convenience for
certain operators were exempted from the act.' 6 ' The bill gave the Department of Natural Resources the power to seek judicial enforcement
of any liabilities imposed under the act.'6 2 The bill required, as had
the 1970 Act, that applicants for terminal facility registration certificates
show they could provide all necessary equipment to prevent, contain,
and remove discharges,16 3 but the bill gave the department added inof the department who had arrest powers could arrest a person who had committed a
misdemeanor in his or her presence or could arrest a person whom he or she had
probable cause to believe had committed a felony.
154. FLA. S. JouR. 96 (1974).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 322 (1974).
159. Compare Fla. H.R. 3388, § 1 (.1974) with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 2(3), 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
160. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 1 (1974).
161. Id. § 3.
162. Id. § 5.
163. Compare Id. § 6 with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch.
70-244, § 6, 1970 Fla. Laws 740. Fla. H.R. 3388 also referred to registration certificates
for terminal facilities, rather than licenses, the term used in the 1970 Act. Compare Fla.
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spection powers relating to this requirement. 1 6 In response to the
shipping industry's complaints, House Bill 3388 featured a new provision which directed that DNR could not require vessels to maintain
spill prevention and containment gear in excess of federal requirements.'l

5

House Bill 3388 revamped the Florida Coastal Protection Fund
to "provide a mechanism to have financial resources immediately available for cleanup and rehabilitation after a pollutant has been discharged, to prevent further damage by the pollutant, and to pay for
damages."' 16 House Bill 3388 also added language to this portion of
the act which indicated the intent of the legislature that this section be
construed liberally in light of danger to the environment and resources.'6 7 The Fund was limited to $200,000,000, as opposed to the
$50,000,000 limit set forth in the 1970 Act." The Fund was to be
created from excise taxes, registration fees, and judgments relating to
the act.' 69 The liability of the Fund would be limited to $100,000,000
per occurrence,

7

0

and monies could be disbursed for items described

in the 1970 Act, as well as for all provable costs and damages which
were the proximate results of the discharge of pollutants covered by the
act.171 Any person claiming damages could thus apply to the Fund

and could be confident of recovery for all provable damages. Claimants
were also given the right to sue for any remedy allowable under law
against a vessel or terminal facility, with the Department being subrogated to any cause of action to the extent of any payments made from
172

the Fund.

H.R. 3388, § 6 (1974) with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch.
70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
164. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 7 (1974).
165. Id.
166. Compare id. § 11 with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act,
ch. 70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
167. Compare Fla. H.R. 3388, § 11 (1974) with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
168. Compare Fla. H.R. 3388, § 11 (1974) with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
169.
Fla. H.R. 3388, § 11 (1974). House Bill 3388 also provided for the levy of
excise taxes upon registrants for the privilege of operating a terminal facility and
handling pollutants. Id. The 1970 Act had channeled registration fees into the fund.
The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 11, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
170. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 12 (1974). If total awards exceeded $100,000,000, they were to
be distributed on a pro rata basis.
. 171. Id. § 11. DNR could disburse monies from the 1970 Coastal Protection Fund for
administrative expenses, personnel expenses and equipment costs of the Department
related to enforcement of the Act, all costs involved in the abatement of pollution
hazards, and all costs of cleanup and rehabilitation of water fowl and wildlife. The
Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 11. 1970 Fla. Laws 740,
172. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 12 (1974).
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In contrast to the 1970 law which established no limit on liability,
House Bill 3388 provided that vessels responsible for a discharge be
liable to the fund for all costs of cleanup in an amount up to
$14,000,000 or $100 per gross registered ton, whichever is less. 73
House Bill 3388 also granted the four common law defenses which
174
had been included in the 1970 law.
Finally, the bill required owners or operators of terminal facilities
or vessels to establish evidence of financial responsibility pursuant to
federal laws and regulations, in contrast to the 1970 law, which had
required financial responsibility based on the capacity of the terminal
7 5
facility or the tonnage of the vessel.
House Bill 3388 had been introduced on April 15, 1974; on
April 18, 1974, the Senate again took up consideration of Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 132. Senator Sayler withdrew his pending
amendment regarding liability of licensees,1 7 and Senators Brantley,
Barron,'177 and de la Parte offered Amendment 11 to the bill. Amendment 11 amended Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 132 to near
conformity with House Bill 3388, except it limited the Florida Coastal
Protection Fund to $35,000,000, rather than the $200,000,000 limit proposed in House Bill 3388, and provided for a lower excise tax to
support the fund.. s Amendment 11 concomitantly limited the amount
of recovery against the fund to $35,000,000 per occurrence, but provided, as did House Bill 3388, for pro rata distribution in the event total
awards exceeded the limitation.17 1 Amendment 11 did not provide, as
did House Bill 3388,180 for any appropriations from the general revenue
fund as initial funding of the Florida Coastal Protection Fund. Senator

173. Compare Fla. H.R. 3388, § 12 (1974) with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch. 70-244, § 12, 1970 Fla. Laws 740. House Bill 3388 also provided
that discharges which were the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within
the privity and knowledge of the owner, operator, or agent of the vessel would subject
the owner, operator, or agent to liability for the full amount of funds expended for cleanup. Additionally, House Bill 3388 limited liability for discharges from terminal facilities
to $8,000,000 in the absence of willful negligence or misconduct. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 12
(1974).
174. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 12 (1974). See text accompanying note 36 supra.
175. Compare id. § 13 with The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act,
ch. 70-244, § 14, 1970 Fla. Laws 740.
176. FLA. S. JouR. 179 (1974).
177. Dem.-Panama City.
178. FA. S. JOUR. 81-82 (1974). See Fla. H.R. 3388, § 11 (1974). Upon motion by
Senator Brantley, author David Barrett, Staff Director of the House Select Committee
on Oil Spill Legislation, was granted Senate floor privileges to explain House Bill 3388.
FLA. S. JouR. 178 (1974).
179.-. FLA. S. JouR. 183 (1974). See Flai, H.R. 3388, § 12 (1974).
180. Fla. H.R. 3388, § 19 (1974).
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Sayler later attempted to add this provision to Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 132, but his amendment failed.""1
Senators Ware,'

2

Sayler, and Myers18 3 immediately offered an

amendment to Amendment 11 which provided that claimants not recovering the full amount of their damages from the fund because of
proration shall have the right to recover the remaining damages in
court proceedings.18 4 This amendment was adopted.11 5 An amendment

making a violation of the act a misdemeanor was later rescinded. 8 6
Senator Sayler again attempted to reinstate liability of owners or
operators for damages other than cleanup costs, and suggested limiting the defenses available to registrants, as well as increasing the limitation of liability to $30,000,000.181 This composite amendment failed.'88
The Senate later adopted another amendment to Amendment 11,
which made underwater pipelines terminal facilities for purposes of
the act. 18 9 Other amendments to Amendment 11 increased the excise
tax levied on registrants and provided for appropriation of $10,000,000
from the general revenue fund as initial funding for the Coastal Protection Fund.190
Amendment 11, as amended, was adopted. Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 132, as amended, was referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means on April 22, 1974.191 There was not sufficient support

available to retrieve the bill from committee until the following day,
when Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 132 was withdrawn from
92
committee by a two-thirds vote.

On April 25, 1974, Amendment 11 was read for the third time by
title. 193 After a rules skirmish, several minor amendments, and one
more unsuccessful attempt by Senator Saylor to increase the limitation
of liability of spillors, Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 132 as
19
amended was passed by the Senate by a 33-7 vote. '

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.,
188.
189.
.190.
revenue
- 191.
192.
193.

FLA. S. JouR. 196 (1974).

Rep.-St. Petersburg.
Dem.-Miami.
FLA. S. JouR. 183 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 184, 196.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. The amendment provided that the money was to be returned to the general
fund within five years of transfer.
ld. at 19- ..
..
.
Id. at 199, 222.
Id. at 266.

194. Id. at 267.
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Senator Lori Wilson,"9 5 who voted against the passage of the committee substitute, voiced the reasons for her opposition:
I have some very basic concerns with CS for SB 132. In my
opinion, the third party defense leaves a large loophole for oil spillers
to get off the hook. The $14,000,000 cap is a far cry from the suggested
possible damage figure of over two billion dollars reported by the
federal government on the Maritime Administration Tanker Program of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The argument that the shippers cannot get insurance simply
will not hold water, much less oill None of us can go out and buy
unlimited liability insurance; yet every time we drive a car or someone walks on our property, we face unlimited liability.
Florida must take into consideration its expanse of beaches which
generates income from tourism. Its coastal waters are a source of
revenue from sports and commercial fishing. Beach development
represents billions in investment dollars and in tax returns.
Let us review the situation. I think the people have reached the
limits of their endurance with the oil companies. Isn't it strange
that we didn't have an energy crisis until we as a people became concerned about our environment? Isn't it strange that under the auspices
of an "energy crisis" the oil companies are now writing their own
ticket? Under the guise of the energy crisis the oil companies have
received:
1. The Alaskan pipe line;
2. Off-shore oil drilling;
3. Price increases on oil products;
4. Limited liability on oil spills?
Many people find it quite ironic that the gasoline shortage seemed
to go away with the outlandish price increases on a gallon of gasoline. I am not surprised that the oil shippers readily agree to a tax to
be placed in a clean-up fund. We have all already seen how these
taxes have a way of being passed on to the consumer. This is just
another way of saying let the people of Florida pay.
Any mother knows that the best way to begin to teach children to
be careful and responsible is to say "You spilled it-you clean it
98
up".1
The bill as passed was certified to the House of Representatives,
where it was referred to the Committees on Environmental Protection,
Finance and Taxation, and Appropriations. 11 7 Once Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 132 was available to the House for consideration,
comparatively little floor debate occurred before it was passed.
195.

196.
197.

Ind.-Merritt Island.
FLA. S. JOUR. 267 (1974).
FLA. H.R. JouR. 533 (1974).
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The title of the Coastal Protection Fund was amended to Florida
Coastal Protection Trust Fund. 98 Other amendments revealed the
issues which divided the House of Representatives. Liability of
terminal facility (as opposed to vessel) operators for cleanup costs had
been limited to $8,000,000 by Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 132
as amended. Representatives Becker' 9 and Roger Wilson 20 0 attempted
to increase the limit to $14,000,000, but the amendment was tabled
by a 69-39 vote.20 1 Representative Becker introduced an amendment
which prohibited hold-harmless agreements between vessels or terminal
facilities and governmental agencies or subdivisions. After some delay
and parliamentary maneuvering, the amendment was passed by 13
votes. 2° There was an attempt by Representative Rude20 3 to limit the
life of the section limiting liability. That amendment, which was
tabled, would have made the limitation of liability provision null and
void on July 1, 1976, and incapable of being reenacted. 0 4 After final
debate on May 31, 1974, the bill was, as amended, passed by the House
by a vote of 91-28."15
On the same day, the Senate, upon motion by Senator Brantley,
concurred in the House amendments to the bill, and Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 132 passed by a 30-7 vote. 0
approved by the Governor on June 27, 1974.207

The bill was

III. ALTERNATE OIL SPILL REMEDIES
A.

Tort Law

Some of the initial testimony at the hearings came from lawyers
who spoke about the difficulty of obtaining relief under the normal
tort causes of action. Tom Post, Port Warden of the Port of Miami,
spoke at those hearings, but at a later symposium' 0 he capsulized the
problems involved with finding an appropriate cause of action by
stating:

198. Id. at 1176.
199. Dem.-Miami.
200. Rep.-Seminole.
201. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1179, 1180 (1974).
202. Id. at 1180-1239.
203. Rep.-Ft. Lauderdale.
204. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1239 (1974).
205.. Id.
206. FLA. S. JOUR. 890 (1974).
207. The Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act, ch. 74-336, 1974 Fla. Laws 1050.
208. Mr. Post spoke in Rensselaerville, N.Y., September 25-28, 1973, at the Invitational Symposium co-sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency.
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Under current legal standards of liability, great difficulties await
private parties seeking to recover damages caused by a vessel's discharge of oil on the navigable waters of the United States. Today, in
most states, injured parties must rely primarily on traditional concepts of tort liability intertwined with various aspects of maritime
law as a basis for recovery. In this regard, the common law tort concepts of trespass, negligence, and nuisance may be available to an individual initiating an action in either federal or state courts. However, aside from the enormous expenditures of time and money
involved in such a lawsuit, the injured party also faces the difficult
problem of bearing the burden of proof.
Trespass may be an effective means for recovering compensation
for owners of oil-damaged beachfront property, piers, oyster beds or
sea farms. However, the claimant must prove that the discharge of
oil which resulted in his damage was intentionally or negligently
caused. Moreover, because trespass must involve actual entry or intrusion onto property this would preclude its use by those who can
show no actual oil invasion of their property, such as non-beachfront
restaurant or gas station owners and the like. Negligence, while one
of the principal means for recovering damages for the maritime tort
of oil pollution, poses a great burden to the claimant in that he
must prove the existence of a legal or proximate cause of his damage.
This may be particularly onerous for the non-beachfront owner whose
only actual damage may be economic. Nuisance theory may also be
a means for compensation recovery if the claimant can prove that
his damage is distinct from that of the public at large. Yet, the
problems of proving the intentional or negligent cause of the interference with the claimant's use and enjoyment of his land, which
gives rise to the theory, and the origin of the oil discharge make this
a difficult means of recovery. The maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness has also been suggested as a possible means for recovery, but
the courts have yet to accept it.209
B.

Admirality

An attorney wishing to bring a claim in federal court for pollution damage may find reparation available under admiralty law.1 °
209. Assessing the Social Impacts of Oil Spills, Background Papers and Conference
Proceedings of an Invitational Symposium at 21 (published by the Institute on Man
and Science, Feb. 1974) [Comm. file]. For a more detailed treatment of the means of
seeking private compensation for damage due to oil spills, see Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Discharge of Oil from Vessels on the Navigable Waters
of the United States: A Survey, 4 J. MAR. L. AND CoM. 25 (1972). See also Sweeny, Oil
Pollution.of the Oceans, 37 FoRDHAM L. REv. 3 (1968).
210. This article will not deal extensively with remedies in admiralty for oil pollution damages. For a discussion of admiralty remedies for oil spills, see Roady, Remedies
in Admiralty for Oil Pollution, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. -361 (1977) infra. For a survey
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the fact that a
damaging incident occurs in navigable waters (the locale test) is insufficient to vest admiralty jurisdiction and that the wrong must bear
a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." ' ' Thus,
212
compensation may be available for on-shore pollution damage
caused by a mid-sea collision of two pollutant-carrying freighters
(shipping is a traditional maritime activity), but may not be available
for the same damage caused by the explosion of an off-shore oil-drilling
2 1
rig (not a traditional maritime activity).
Any action brought in admiralty will face the application of the
Federal Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act. 214 This act limits a
vessel owner's liability for damage resulting from the vessel's operation
(which occurs without the owner's privity or knowledge) to the value
of the vessel plus the value of the freight then pending.2 The United
States Supreme Court has qualified this limitation, construing liability
as being limited by the value of the vessel and freight at the termination of the voyage during which the damaging incident occurred."16
The Limitation of Liability Act may affect certain rights of recovery created by various states. 21 7 If a suit has been filed in state court
and the claimant later contests the shipowner's right to limit liability,
federal court becomes the appropriate forum.2 ' 8 However, a shipowner's recourse to the Limitation of Liability Act is restricted in
that the shipowner must file a petition for limitation within six months
22 9
of receipt of notice of claim.
The implications of this act are sobering for anyone preparing a
claim for damages from pollution or for recovery of cleanup costs. If
the aggregate sum of damage claims resulting from pollution discharge
from a vessel exceeds the value of the vessel and the onboard cargo,
many claimants may go without full compensation if the limitation is
of admiralty jurisdiction of oil spill claims, see McCoy, Oil Spill Control, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 97 (1971). The same article also points out the conflicts between state oil spill
law and admiralty law.
211. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
212. The Extension of Admiralty Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970) provides for
recovery for on-shore damage caused by vessels in navigable water.
213. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
214. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 3,
9 Stat. 635).
215. Id.
216. Place v. Norwich & New York Trans. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
217. See In Re Highland Navigation Corp., 24 F.2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1927), aff'd, 29 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1928) (Limitation of Liability Act cannot be qualified by local ordinance).
See generally Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (New York workmen's
compensation law invalid insofar as it contravenes established federal admiralty law).
218. See Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
219. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1976).
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applied. 22 0 If a vessel discharging oil sinks or is destroyed and rendered
worthless and the owner is allowed to limit liability, spill claimants
21

may be left with no hope of compensation.2

The act could breed inequities; its usefulness is questionable in
light of insurance and modern corporate structures which could lessen
the impact of a claim. The late Justice Black expressed the thought
that "[j]udicial expansion" of the Limitation of Liability Act was "inappropriate."2 2 2 Yet when the Supreme Court was presented with the
issue of the relationship of the Limitation of Liability Act with federal
and state laws which set liability limits which could conceivably exceed
the limits of the act, the Court sidestepped the opportunity to settle
the question.2 2 3 Thus, the limitation may remain in effect. Any direct
action to impose liability on persons responsible for pollution damage,
whether in the courts or in the legislature, must deal with this issue.
C.

TO VALOP-CRISTAL

Once the attempts to receive compensation for the costs of cleaning up the Torrey Canyon oil spill highlighted the inadequacies of
tort remedies, government and business accelerated their efforts to
develop answers to the legal problems created by pollutant spills.
Several oil transporting companies organized themselves into the
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation in December,
1968, to create and administer a plan for the compensation of oil spill
damage and cleanup expenses." 4 Just two weeks later the terms of the
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil
Pollution (TOVALOP) were finalized 225 and signed by the seven
220. For example, after the Torrey Canyon disaster, the Liberian owner of the
ship, Barracuda Tanker Corporation, and the charterer, Union Oil Company of California, filed a petition for limitation in federal district court in New York. Limitation
was allowed as to Barracuda, leaving $50, the value of the one remaining lifeboat, to be
the limit of Barracuda's liability. However, Union Oil Company, the time charterer
of the vessel, was not allowed to limit liability, for the Act applies only to owners and
bareboat charterers. In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd in part, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Note, A Proposal to Protect Maine
from the Oilbergs of the 70's, 22 MAINE L. REV. 481, 494-95 (1970).
221. See The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
604 (1933).
222. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
223. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).. For a
more complete discussion of Askew, see Section IV infra.
224. Memorandum and Articles of Ass'n of the Int'l Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation, Ltd. (Incorporated December 24, 1968), cl.III, para. (A) [Comm. file].
225. Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
[hereinafter TOVALOP], Preamble. (Published by International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd., London, England, as amended July 14, 1972.) (Original version
published at 8 Ikr'L LEGAL MATERIALs 497 (1969).)
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original tanker owner sponsors. By October 6, 1969, there were
sufficient signatories to bring TOVALOP into operation, and by 1974
owners of ninety-nine percent of the free world's tanker tonnage had
signed the Agreement 2" One authority described it as "essentially...
a self-insurance agreement among tanker owners which will provide
instant funds to national governments for cleanup costs."

227

When

certain inadequacies of TOVALOP became apparent, the Contract
Regarding Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
(CRISTAL) was developed to provide additional funds to compensate
a wider range of claims. 2 2 More an attempt to forestall radical judicial

or legislative reappraisal of the limited liability acts of the various
229
nations than a great exertion to correct an inequitable situation,
TOVALOP and CRISTAL provided for the creation of a limited
fund which, once applied for, would act as the only settlement of any
claim, even if compensation were not complete. 2 0 Thus, the two agree-

ments serve as private limitation of liability acts and exist as a form
of insurance for participating members.
TOVALOP allows reimbursement only to governments for their
cleanup costs22 1 while CRISTAL provides compensation for damages
to individuals and governments. 2 32 Because CRISTAL is the supplement to TOVALOP, TOVALOP must be explained before CRISTAL
can be understood.
In TOVALOP, each participating tanker owner agrees to "establish
and maintain his financial capability ' 2' 3 to withstand a limited liability
226.

Becker, A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 5 J.

MAR.

L. AND COM. 609, 610 (1974).

227. Note, A Proposal to Protect Maine from the Oilbergs of the 70's, supra note 220,
at 497 (citations omitted).
228. Contract Regarding Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
[hereinafter CRISTAL], Preamble. (Published by Oil Companies Institute for Marine
Pollution Compensation Ltd., Hamilton, Bermuda, Aug. 1, 1975.) (Original version
published at 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 137 (1970).)
229. TOVALOP provides only for a limited liability based on a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and applies only to the contamination of the shoreline.
It does not cover fire, explosions, ecological and other consequential damages. The
members of TOVALOP are aware of the well documented damages caused by
spilled oil and are aware that private parties are severely restricted by the Limitation of Liability Act. Therefore, the purpose behind TOVALOP can only be
construed as a feint in the direction of industrial reform to head off significant
governmental reforms, and as an inexpensive means of meeting the financial
responsibility sections of the recent federal legislation.
Note, A Proposal to Protect Maine from the Oilbergs of the 70's, supra note 220, at 498.
But see Becker, supra note 226, which presents a more favorable analysis of TOVALOP
and CRISTAL.
230. TOVALOP, supra note 225, cl. VII, para. (F).
231. Id. c. IV, para. (A).
232. CRISTAL, supra note 228, cl. IV, para. (A).
233. TOVALOP, supra note 225, cl. II, para. (C). Financial capability may be

342

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.5:309

for claims. 3 4 The recovery process provided by TOVALOP is simple.

By signing TOVALOP, a participating tanker owner agrees to report
any discharge of oil to the Tanker Owners Federation and to describe
the action taken to remove the oil.235 The Tanker Owners Federation
then contacts the government of the country affected by the oil spill,
informing it of the TOVALOP provisions and its options under
TOVALOP.2 16 If the government chooses to seek recovery under
27
TOVALOP, it files notice of a claim against the participating owner 1
for reimbursement for the costs of cleanup or prevention 281 of damage
23 9
by a spill, within one year from the date of the offending oil spill.
If the tanker owner and the government claimant agree on the liability
involved, the tanker owner reimburses the government as full settlement of that government's claims against the tanker owner.24 0 If the
parties cannot agree or if the tanker owner refuses to accept responsibility for an oil spill, TOVALOP provides for arbitration proceedings to settle the matter.241 Under TOVALOP it is possible for an
arbitration board appointed and acting according to the conciliation
and arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce to
24 2
enforce liability.
There are certain standards regulating the determination of fault
and the imposition of liability. The TOVALOP rules impose a presumption of negligence which the tanker owner must overcome by
24
proving that the discharge occurred without the fault of the tanker. 3
The claimant government, however, has the burden of proving that
24
the oil causing damage was discharged from the particular tanker. 4
A tanker owner's liability is limited under TOVALOP. The maximum reimbursement for a negligently caused oil spill is the lesser of
$100 per gross registered ton (g.r.t.) of the offending tanker or

established "through arrangements either with a P & I Club, an insurance company or
the International Tanker Indemnity Association Limited, a company formed specifically
for the purpose of providing TOVALOP cover, or otherwise as may from time to time
be determined by the Federation." Id., Foreword. A "P & I Club" is an insurance
company known as a "mutual protection and indemnity club"; most tankers are insured
through such dubs. Who Pays for Pollution Cleanup?, 21 EXXON MARINE 18 (1976)
[Comm. file].
234. TOVALOP, supra note 225, cl. VI.
235. Id. cl. VII, para. (A).
236. Id. cl. VII, para. (B).
237. Id. cl. VII, para. (C).
238.
239.

Id. c. IV, para. (A).
Id. cl. VII, para. (D).

240.
241.

Id. cl. VII, para. (F).
Id. c. VI, para. (E).

242.

Id. c. VII, paras. (E) & (K).

243.
244.

Id. c. IV, para. (B).
Id. cl. VH, para. (K).
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$10,000,000. 215 If several governments are involved, the owner's maxi-

mum allowable liability to a particular government is determined by
the proportion of that government's removal expenses to the sum
of the various governments'

removal

expenses.214

The maximum

liability limitation includes any cost incurred by the tanker owner in
cleaning up the oil spill. Thus, if a tanker owner and one or more
governments incur removal expenses which in total exceed the liability
limitation, each is entitled to a proportional share of the maximum
liability amount.

24 7

TOVALOP is available only to national governments for reimbursement of funds expended in preventing impending damage caused by
an oil spill or in cleaning up the spill2 ,Band to tanker owners for reimbursement for cleanup costs.

249

It does not allow compensation to

private parties or for damage from "fire or explosion, consequential
damage, or ecological impairment."

250

TOVALOP has one very positive function: it encourages tanker
owners to clean up spillage. Before TOVALOP, tanker owners had
little reason to incur the added expense of removing an oil spill. With
TOVALOP, the shipowner's insurer reimburses the shipowner for
cleanup costs. With this assurance, tanker owners are more likely to
2 51
respond promptly to the oil spillage.

In view of the possible consequences of an oil spill, such limitations
on a government's claims may seem too strict, especially when the maximum liability allowed is $10,000,000. The cost to the fund and to the
English and French governments of cleaning up the oil spilled by the
Torrey Canyon in 1967 was in excess of $16,000,000.252 Although the
245. Id. cl. VI, para. (A).
246. Id. c. VI, para. (B).
247. Id. c. VI, para. (C) provides:
If, however, a Participating Owner and a Government (or Governments
incur Removal expenses as a result of the same Incident, then the Participating
Owner's liability shall in no event exceed that part of the limit prescribed in
Paragraph (A) hereof [$100 per gross registered ton or $10,000,000, whichever is
less] which the Government's (or Governments') Removal expenses bear to the
aggregate of -the Government's (or Governments') Removal expenses and the
Participating Owner's Removal expenses.
248. Id. cl. IV, para. (A).
249. Id. cl. V.
250. Id. cl. I, para. (H).
251. See id. cl. V; Who Pays for Pollution Cleanup? supra note 234, at 18, 21.
252. Post, supra note 3, at 27. The Torrey Canyon was carrying 880,000 barrels of
crude oil when she broke up; within three days after the grounding the slick was 35
miles long and 18 miles wide. These estimated cleanup costs were those expended only
by the French and British governments; estimated costs to private individuals were
not included. Comment, Post Torrey Canyon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of
Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 CONN. L. REv. 632 (1970).
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French and English governments mishandled the cleanup operation
2 53
and although scientific adso that it cost more than it needed to,
25 4
in the event of a
vances have reduced the cost of cleaning up oil,

breakup of one of the supertankers cruising the ocean today255
TOVALOP liability limitations seem small. The TOVALOP provisions might adequately and efficiently compensate a government for
the costs to clean up an average spill.256
Although TOVALOP pays claims for costs of cleaning up an oil
spill, more loss than mere cleanup costs is usually involved when a
spill occurs. Tanker owners recognized this deficiency in TOVALOP,
and in January, 1971, reached a supplemental agreement: CRISTAL.
Under the terms of CRISTAL, funds are available to provide some
compensation for oil pollution damage suffered by anyone, 2 7 whether
2 8
from an oil
an individual, partnership, or public or private body,
2 9
5
TOVALOP.
of
member
a
by
owned
oil
involving
incident
pollution
Each participating oil company is assessed to create a compensation
fund, thereby enabling CRISTAL to satisfy damage claims. The
amount of money each member is to contribute. is related to each
company's percentage of the total oil shipped by all participating
companies. 260 CRISTAL came into effect on April 1, 1971, and continues to be effective on a year-to-year basis. There are various contingent provisions for termination of CRISTAL, but it terminates
definitely upon either the termination of TOVALOP or upon the
2 81
ratification of an international compensation fund.

253. The basic aim in any cleanup operation is either somehow to collect the
oil or to disperse it over as great a volume of open sea water as possible so that
bacterial action will eventually destroy it. The problem is one of both organization
and technology ....
The grounding of the "Torrey Canyon" and the resultant spillage of over 100,000
tons of oil into the sea well illustrates the magnitude of the technological problem.
Several different methods were used to dispose of the oil: bombing (several
bombs failed to detonate and now litter the ocean floor), burning, sinking, containment and detergents. Not one of the methods used was wholly satisfactory,
and some seemed to create more pollution than the oil itself.
Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J., 316, 355 (1969) (citations
omitted). For various estimates of costs see Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup
and the Water Quality Control Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 982
n.78 (1970).
254. See Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, supra note 253, at 356-58.
255. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
256. See Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality Control Improvement Act of 1970, supra note 253, at 982 n.78, 938 n.82.
257. CRISTAL, supra note 228, cl. IV, para. (A).
258. Id. cl. I, para. (B).
259. Id. cl, IV, para. (A).
V, para. (2).
260. Id. cl.
261. Id. cl. III, para. (C)(l)(iii).
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Although the initial Fund was $5,000,000,262 the Oil Companies
Institute for Marine Pollution Compensation, Limited (Institute),
the management for CRISTAL, assured that up to $30,000,000 would
be available for compensation claims for pollution damage.263 However,
the compensation plan is computed so that less than the full
$30,000,000 is actually available for damage claimants. Before the
Institute will release any funds from CRISTAL, it subtracts the following four amounts from the maximum of $30,000,000 that is available:
(1) The owner's or bareboat charterer's maximum liability for said
pollution damage under TOVALOP;
(2) The amount of expenditures that the owner or bareboat
charterer was entitled to make for "removal of oil" (as defined
in TOVALOP) and to receive reimbursement for as provided
in TOVALOP;
(3) The maximum liability of owner or bareboat charterer with
respect to such damage under applicable law, statutes, regulations or conventions; and
(4) The maximum amount to which such persons sustaining pollution damage were entitled from any other person or from the
ship or from any other vessel under applicable law, statutes,
regulations or conventions providing for compensation for all
2
or part of said damage. 64
Finally, CRISTAL funds are available only if the claimant has
265
exhausted all other remedies for compensation.
The combination of the prerequisites to reimbursement could
result in very little money available for multiple claimants. A tanker
which incurred the maximum liability under (1) and (3) above would
immediately reduce the available amount by $24,000,000, thus leaving
only $6,000,000 of the $30,000,000 fund; the $6,000,000 could be
-1
further reduced or eliminated by items (2) and (4).265
D.

InternationalLaw

The international community has developed its own means of
holding tanker owners responsible for pollution damage caused by their
262. Id. cl. V, para. (1).
263. Id. c. IV, paras. (A) & (B).
264. Id. cl. IV, para. (B)(l)-(4).
265. Id. cl. IV, para. (D).
265.1 Maximum liability under (1), TOVALOP, is $10,000,000. Under item (3),
maximum federal liability would be $14,000,000. See Section III-E infra. As those two
amounts total $24,000,000, the theoretical $30,000,000 CRISTAL liability is immediately
reduced to $6,000,000, subject to further reduction under items (2) and (4).
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ships. In 1969, representatives from nineteen countries signed the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage "16 and returned with it to their respective countries for ratification. The 1969 conference participants drafted a resolution urging the
establishment of an international compensation fund to supplement
the 1969 Convention. 6 7 In 1971, the Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund "for Compensation for Oil Pollution
2
Damage was drafted and signed. s
If the 1969 Civil Liability Convention is ratified, it may preempt all other means of recourse for compensation for damages. It
provides that: "No claim for compensation for pollution damages
shall be made against the owner otherwise than in accordance with
'
provision, claims against
Also, under this same
[the] convention. ' 26
270
barred.
are
agents
or
an owner's servants
One author asserts that the 1969 Convention is the only workable
long-term solution. 27 1 The Convention states that "the owner of a
ship

...

shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which

"272 The 1969 Conhas escaped or been discharged from the ship ..
vention allows a shipowner to limit liability for oil spill damage if he
will constitute a fund equaling the limit of his liability.2 72 Under the
terms of the 1969 Convention, a shipowner can limit liability for all
damage claims from any one accident to an aggregate amount of 2,000

266. The text of the 1969 Convention is published at 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45
(1970). The nineteen countries signing the Convention in November of 1969 were Belgium,
the Cameroon, the Republic of China, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ghana,
Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Monaco,
Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 20-21 (1970). As of January 1, 1977, 31 nations had ratified the
Convention. VI R. CHURCHILL, M. NORDQUIST & S. LAY, NEW DISCRETIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 790-95 (1977). The Convention has not yet been ratified by the United States.
267. The Int'l Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, Resolution on
Establishment of an Int'l Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 66 (1970).
268. The Convention is the result of the International Conference on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, held in Brussels
from November 29 to December 18, 1971. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 284 (1971). See id.
for the text of the Convention. The United States has not ratified the Convention, nor was
it in force as of January 1, 1977. R. CHURCtILL, M. NORDqUiST, & S. LAY, supra, note 266,
at 790-95.
269. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, art. III, para. 4, supra note 266.
270. Id.
271. See generally Becker, supra note 226.
272. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, art. III, para. 1, supra note 266. The term "damage" is not defined in the Convention.
273. Id. art. V, para. 3. This can be accomplished directly by the shipowner or
through insurance. Id. paras. 3, 11.
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francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage, with a maximum liability of
210 million francs.274 Limitation is not allowed if the owner was
actually or by privity responsible for the incident.2 75 The Convention

requires the owner of a ship carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil in
bulk cargo to maintain insurance or some other financial security in
21
the amount of the limits of liability under the Convention. 1
Thus the 1969 Civil Liability Convention assures that some claimants in a signatory nation will have an available source of funds as
compensation for damages. For those injured by oil spills, procedures
for receiving compensation for damages or for the cost of cleanup are
simpler under the 1969 Convention than through a common law tort
action. A state does not have to seize another ship or property owned
by the responsible ship owner to be assured that claims will be satisfied. In fact, under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention such seizure
is not allowed.

27

A claimant must bring suit in a court within whose jurisdictional
territory the damage occurred, giving reasonable notice to the defendant. 278 Once jurisdiction has been established,2

79

the court has

exclusive control over the fund constituted by the defendant.2 80 The
1969 Convention has made oil transportation a hazardous activity and
holds a vessel owner liable for any pollution damage caused by oil
which has escaped or been discharged from the ship.21 The only defenses available to the owner are those similar to the four common
282
law defenses; the defenses wholly release the owner from liability.
Another defense, "that the pollution damage resulted wholly or
partially either from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by the person who suffered the damage or from negligence of
28 3
that person," may release the owner wholly or partially from liability.
However, liability is limited to the amount of the required fund. If
there are multiple claimants, any recovery will be distributed in proportion to their respective claims. 28 4 No other claims are allowed, 285 and
274. Id. art. V, para. 1.
275. Id. art. V, para. 2.
276. Id. art. VII, para. 1.
277. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
278. Id. art. IX, para. 1.
279. "Each Contracting State shall insure that its Courts possess the necessary
jurisdiction to entertain such actions for compensation." Id. art. IX, para. 2.
280. Id. art. IX, para. 3.
281. Id. art. III, para. 1.
282. Id. art. III, para. 2. The four common law defenses-:act of God, act of war, act
of third party, and act of government-have been consolidated to three defenses in the
1969 Convention. Act of God and act of war constitute one defense.
283. Id. art. III, para. 3.
284. Id. art. V, para. 4.
285. Id. art. III, para. 4.
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a claimant cannot "exercise any right against other assets of the owner
286
in respect of such claim.."
The fund established by the 1971 Convention provides additional
compensation for those unable to collect their claims fully and adequately under the terms of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.2 8 7 The
Fund will also reimburse the owner for losses incurred in voluntarily
2 8s
preventing or minimizing pollution damages.
The 1971 Fund is limited in that it will not pay for pollution
damage from tankers caught in the midst of wars, nor will it pay if
the claimant cannot prove the damage resulted from an incident involving one or more ships.2 8 9 The Fund may be exonerated from
liability to the extent that the claimant wholly or partially caused
the damages himself, either intentionally or negligently.9 6
The practicing attorney should be aware of the 1969 and 1971
Conventions, for if they are ratified by the United States they will
offer potential avenues of recovery for pollutant-damaged claimants.
E.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970291 limited a vessel
owner's liability to the lesser of $100 per gross registered ton or
$14,000,000, and held the spillor absolutely liable with the exception
of the four common law defenses .- 2 Allan I. Mendelsohn, a consultant
on maritime law, described the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970 as "the first significant inroad that had ever been made [on] the
limitation . . . of ship owners liability .... .. 2
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 was amended by the

286. Id. art. VI, para. 1(a).
287. See International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, Preamble, supra note 268.
288. Id. art. IV, para. I.
289. Id. art. IV, para. 2(a)-(b).
290. Id. art. IV, para. l(a) and 3. The 1971 Convention also exonerates the Fund to
the extent that the 1969 Civil Liability Convention releases a spillor from liability in
case of sabotage. Id.
291. Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970)) (current version
at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975)). According to one witness, the 1970 Federal Act went
through the same tumultuous legislative process in Congress as the Florida Pollutant
Spill Prevention and Control Act did in the 1974 Florida Legislature. In his appearance
before the Ad Hoc Committee on Oil Spill Legislation on September 11, 1973, Allen I.
Mendelsohn presented a chart to demonstrate the way the limits and standards of
liability were gradually whittled down from the terms of S. 2760 to the final form of the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at
11-13 (written statement and testimony by Allan I. Mendelsohn).
292. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, § 11(f), 84 Stat. 91.
293. Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 14 (testimony of Allan I. Mendelsohn).
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Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.24 The 1972 Act increased the
responsibility of the oil transport industry for some of the costs suffered
due to its activities. The Act specifically stated that there shall be "no
discharges of oil . . . into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States" and provided for penalties.2 15 The 1972 Act does, however,
provide limits of civil liability. If the spillor owns or operates a vessel
which has discharged oil, liability is limited to $100 per gross registered
ton of such vessel, with a maximum of $14,000,000,296 and if the discharge was from either an onshore or offshore facility, the owner's
or operator's liability is limited to $8,000,000.11 Liability can be additionally restricted by the reasonable costs incurred in the removal of
the oil discharged from the vessel or facility. 298 If, however, the government proves that the discharge was the result of willful negligence or
willful misconduct, the spillor will be liable for the full cost.
Criticism of the federal liability limits is similar to that made of
the limits set by TOVALOP and the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
For small spills and discharges that happen daily, such limitations are
probably reasonable. Were a large spill to occur, however, the limited
liability might not provide adequate compensation, and the United
States government would have to bear the excess cost of cleaning up the
pollutants. Considering the growing size of supertankers and the increasing use of offshore deep water tanker platforms, the chances of
mammoth spills are high.3 0 The liability limits in such cases are of
questionable desirability.0 1
Another similarity to TOVALOP and the 1969 Civil Convention
lies in the requirement that owners and operators establish proof of
financial responsibility. The Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
requires that vessel owners or operators establish and maintain evidence
of financial responsibility equivalent to their maximum liability
limits. 30 2 Evidence of responsibility is required before any vessel over
300 gross registered tons can use any port, place, or navigable waters
of the United States.30 3 The United States government would therefore
be able to recover a judgment against a vessel owner upon establishing
294.
Stat. 816
295.
296.
297.
298.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86
(Codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) and (b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 1321(0(1).
Id. § 1321(0(2).
Id. § 1321(i)(1).
Id. § 1321(f)(1) and (2).

299.
300. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
301. See also notes 220-23 supra and accompanying text,
302. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(p) (Supp. V 1975).
303.

Id.

350

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.5:309

liability; it would not have to seize another vessel or other property
in order to satisfy a claim.
The federal government now also has a $35,000,000 revolving fund
for the control of pollution. This fund is available to establish the
National Contingency Plan for the removal of oil, to supply funds
to the federal government for its cleanup expenses, and to reimburse
spillors who acted to remove an oil discharge for which they were
not responsible. 30 4 The federal government appropriated the initial
monies for the federal fund and maintains it with fines and liability
reimbursement payments. s0 5 Costs not reimbursed to the government
are supplied from general revenue. 0 6
The 1972 Act differs from the proposed international programs
in that recovery under any international agreement releases the defendant from claims filed in any other forum by the same claimant. 307
On the other hand, while the federal government's recovery under
the Federal Act is limited to its cleanup costs, 8s the Act also specifically
allows other parties and agencies to sue a spillor for damages to any
publicly- or privately-owned property caused by an oil discharge or the
removal of any oil.30 9 Under the same section of the Federal Act, states
retain the power to impose requirements or liabilities for a discharge
of oil within the waters of the state.310

IV.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE FLORIDA

LAW-

Askew v. American Waterways Operators,Inc.
The 1970 Florida Oil Spill Law was passed in April, but its validity
was challenged prior to full implementation of the provisions of the
Act.", The United States Supreme Court settled some of the constitutional questions regarding that law in Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc.3 1 2 The 1970 Florida law held vessel owners and
operators to a standard of absolute liability and imposed unlimited
304.
305.
306.

Id. § 1321(k).
Id.
Id. § 1321(d).

307. TOVALOP, supra note 225, cl.
VII, para. F; International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, art. III, para. 4, supra note 266.
308. The revolving fund is available only to the federal government to create and
implement the National Contingency Plan, to clean up polluted areas, and to reimburse
the owner or operator of a vessel or terminal facility which was the source of an unavoidable spill. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (Supp. V 1975).
309. Id.§ 1321(o)(1).
310. Id.§ 1321(o)(2).
311. Although the Act went into effect July 1, 1970, the regulations were not fully
written and implemented by March, 1971,-American Waterways Operators, Inc. filed its
complaint March 11, 1971.
312. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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liability for cleanup costs and damages from oil pollution' 313 American
Waterways Operators contended that the Florida law conflicted with the
Federal Act, that it intruded into federal maritime jurisdiction, and
3
that it unconstitutionally regulated foreign commerce.

14

In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the statute was fully constitutional.315 Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, said that the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
as amended in 1972, not only did not preclude, but in fact allowed,
state regulation of the shipping industry's liability for oil spills. He
quoted 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o):
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations of any owner or operator of any vessel, or of any owner
or operator of any onshore facility or offshore facility to any person
or agency under any provision of law for damages to any publiclyowned or privately-owned property resulting from a discharge of any

oil or from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any
State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any waters
within such State.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed . .
3 6
State or local law not in conflict with this section. 1

.

to affect any

Askew v. American Waterways Operators made it clear that a state

statute similar to the Florida Oil Spill Law is constitutionally
permissible so long as it is not in conflict with the terms of the
federal law. The Court pointed out that the provision in the Florida
law which allowed claims for damages (other than cleanup costs) incurred by the state and for damages to private persons did not conflict
with the Federal Act since the Federal Act reaches only the costs
of cleanup. 17 Because "Congress had dealt only with 'cleanup' costs,"
313. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
314. For a more complete discussion of the bases of the complaint, see Section I-C
supra.
315. 411 U.S. at 328.
316. Id. at 329, citing 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o) (1970) (emphasis added by Court). Justice
Douglas referred to the Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
42 (1970):
"[A]ny State would be free to provide requirements and penalties similar to those
imposed by this section or additional requirements and penalties. These, however,
would be separate and independent from those imposed by this section and would
be enforced by the States through its [sic] courts."
411 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added by Court).
317. 411 U.S. at 331. See The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ch.
70-244, § 12, 1970 Fla. Laws 244.
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the Court said, "it left the states free to impose 'liability' in damages
for losses suffered both by the states and by private interests."318 The
Court also noted that the Limitation of Liability Act had no bearing
on the provision of the Florida statute regarding liability of terminal
facilities.3 19 "Moreover," the Court pointed out, "[section] 12 has not
yet been construed by the Florida courts and it is susceptible of an
interpretation so far as vessels are concerned which would be in
harmony with the Federal Act. Section 12 does not in terms provide
3' 20
for unlimited liability."
However, the full impact of the Limitation of Liability Act and
of the federal pollution statute on state pollution control statutes is
not yet known. The Court in Askew left open the questions whether
Florida was restricted to the amount specified in the Federal Act in
recovering the cost of cleanup, and whether the Federal Pollution Act
removes the limitations imposed by the Limitation of Liability Act.
Thus, if an oil transport vessel were to break open off the coast of
Florida, spill its cargo, and sink worthless to the bottom of the sea,
several intriguing legal questions arise. Would the Federal Limitation
of Liability Act apply, leaving state and federal governments as well
as individuals unable to recover their cleanup costs, or would the
higher liability limitation of the Federal Pollution Act apply despite
the Limitation of Liability Act? In addition, it is not clear whether the
total claims of state and federal governments for cleanup costs are
limited by the Federal Act to $14,000,000 or $100 per gross registered
ton, or if the state's cleanup costs may be considered independently
of the federal $14,000,000 limit. The Supreme Court ventured no
definitive answers to these questions:
If Florida wants to take the lead in cleaning up oil spillage in
her waters, she can use § 12 of the Florida Act and recoup her costs
from those who did the damage. Whether the amount of costs she
could recover from a wrongdoer is limited to those specified in the
Federal Act and whether in turn this new Federal Act removes the
pre-existing limitations of liability in the Limited Liability Act are
questions we need not reach here. Any opinion on them is premature.
It is sufficient for this day to hold that there is room for state action
in cleaning up the waters of a State and recouping, at 320.1
least within
costs.
her
concerned,
are
vessels
as
far
so
limits,
federal

318. 411 U.S. at 336.
319. Id. at 331.
320. Id. (emphasis in original).
320.1. Id. at 332.
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Furthermore, the Court did not address the issue of whether the Limitation of Liability Act is applicable to those damages other than the cost
of cleanup suffered both by the State and by individuals.
Having resolved that Florida's statute was not in conflict with the
federal Water Quality Improvement Act, the Court turned to the
problem of conflict between the Florida law and federal admiralty
jurisdiction. The Court framed the issue as "whether a state constitutionally may exercise its police power respecting maritime activities
3
concurrently with the federal government."

21

The Supreme Court noted that early decisions broadening the
scope of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction had been limited, 22 and in
support of that proposition referred to just v. Chambers,32 3 in which
Chief Justice Hughes had stated:
[T]he principle was maintained that a State, in the exercise of its
police power, may establish rules applicable on land and water
within its limits, even though these rules incidentally affect maritime
affairs, provided that the state action 'does not contravene any acts
of Congress, nor work any prejudice to the characteristic features
of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper harmony and uni2
formity in its international and interstate relations.'3 4

The Askew Court declined to carry the early cases giving admiralty a
wide exclusivity "shoreward to oust state law from situations involving
' 3'
shoreside injuries by ships on navigable waters.

25

Moreover, the Court refused to allow the Admiralty Extension
Act 26 to preempt state law in that same situation. While conceding
that Congress had indeed extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries contemplated by the Framers, the Court cautioned:
[I]t hardly follows from the constitutionality of that extension that
we must sanctify the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction to the
exclusion of powers traditionally within the competence of the States.
One can read the history of the Admiralty Extension Act without
finding any clear indication that Congress intended that sea-to-shore
3
injuries be exclusively triable in the federal courts.

27

321. Id. at 337.
322. The Court referred to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1916), and
to Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1919), where the Court had held that
a state could not make a workmen's compensation award to an injured maritime worker
because the remedy in admiralty was exclusive. 411 U.S. at 337-38.
323. 312 U.S. 383 (1940).
324. 411 U.S. at 339, citing 312 U.S. at 389.
325. 411 U.S. at 344.
326. 46 U.S.C. 740 (1970).
327. 411 U.S. at 341 (citations omitted).
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FLORIDA LAW

With this background, the interested attorney can appreciate the
unique effectiveness of the Florida Pollutant Spill Prevention and
Control Act for the individual claimant. The legislation has two major
purposes: to provide quick, inexpensive relief for pollutant-damaged
victims, and at the same time, to create standards and limits for liability
3 2
acceptable to the shipping insurance industries.
To accomplish these divergent goals, the 1974 law
provided adequate funding methods for the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund
(Fund) and significantly expanded access thereto. Monies for the Fund
come from the oil industry; a two cents per barrel tax on pollutants
transferred to or from a terminal facility is levied on each owner or
operator of a terminal facility in the state for the privilege of operating
3 29
the facility.
The Fund was established to assure that there will be a complete
settlement of all valid claims. A two cents per barrel tax is levied until
the balance in the fund equals or exceeds $35,000,000; in the following
fiscal year no tax is levied unless the fund drops below $35,000,000.
In that event, taxing is resumed in the next fiscal year.330 The tax may
be increased by emergency action to pay damages from a catastrophic
spill. 3s ' Thus, if a major spill creates monumental claims which exceed
the Fund's limit, claimants will be paid a pro rata share until their
3 2
claims are satisfied.
The Fund is available to pay for any immediate costs of cleanup
and all provable costs and damages proximately resulting from a discharge of pollutants, whether the claimant is a public, private, or
corporate party. 333 The Fund then aggregates the claims paid and
subrogates the total damage claims and the cleanup costs to the
334
limits of liability against the spillor.
The 1974 law makes the transfer of potential pollutants a hazardous
activity,3 35 eliminates the necessity of proving negligence in any action
for damages or for recovery of cleanup cost,3386 and makes the Fund
328. See FLA. STAT. § 376.021 (1975) (legislative intent); id. § 376.12(1) (liability
limits). See also Section I supra, describing the many economic and political pressures
brought to bear on the Florida Legislature and on the committees reviewing the 1970
Oil Spill Law prior to passage of the 1974 law.
529. FLA. STAT. § 376.11(4)(a) and (b) (1975).
330. Id.§ 376.11(4)(b)(1).
331. Id. § 376.11(4)(b)(2).
332. Id. § 376.12(2)(b) and (6).
333. Id. § 376.11(1) and (5). See generally id. §'37612(2)(a) and (e).
334. Id. § 376.12(1).
335. Id. § 376.021(3)(a).
336. Id. § 376.12(1).
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absolutely liable for all proven damage claims without limitation.3 37
However, the 1974 law allows a spillor the four common law defenses
in a subrogated action for damages, cleanup, or abatement expenses
brought by the Fund.3 8 It also sets the limits of liability for cleanup
costs at the amounts specified in the Federal Act339 and demands no evidence of insurance coverage other than that required by the Federal
Act.3 40
As far as a claimant is concerned, the procedures provided by the
1974 law are not difficult. The claimant has two avenues of relief
through which to collect his claim: filing suit directly against the
alleged spillor, 34'1 or filing a claim against the Fund with the Florida
Department of National Resources (DNR) within one year from the
first date of the offense. 42 Because the 1974 law makes the transfer of
oil a hazardous undertaking,343 the only issues presented in a suit
directly against the offending ship owner, facility owner, or facility
operator are the prohibited discharge and damages.344 The claimant
need not plead or prove negligence.345 A claimant must be aware,
however, that the 1974 law allows the defendant to use the four common
law defenses. 34 Additionally, the claimant must face the fact that the
34 7
Federal Limitation of Liability Act limits recovery against vessels.
This might preclude complete recovery if the damage was the result
of a major disaster.
If the claimant, in the alternative, chooses to file a claim with DNR,
the statute practically assures an immediate recovery. 3 8 If the claimant,
the person determined by DNR to be responsible for the spill, and
DNR can agree to the damage claim, settlement is quick and the
claimant is paid from the Fund 3 49 with the spillor reimbursing the
Fund.350 This settlement precludes all other actions.3 51
337. Id. § 376.12(2)(e).
338. Id. § 376.12(4).
339. Compare id. § 376.12(1) with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1)-(3) (Supp. V 1975).
340. FLA. STAT. § 376.14(1) (1975).
341. Id. § 376.205.
342. Id. § 376.12(2).
343. Id. § 376.021(3)(a).
344. Id. § 376.205.
345. Id.
346. Id. §§ 376.12(4), .205.
347. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 at 331-32 (1973);
Section IV supra.
348. FLA. STAT. § 376.021(4)(c) (1975) expresses a legislative intent that the "fund ...
guarantee the prompt payment of . . . damage claims ..

349. Id. § 376.12(2)(a) (1975).
350. See id. § 376.12(2)(d) and (4).
351. Id. § 376.12(2)(a).
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If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the claim is submitted to
arbitration3 52 The 1974 law provides for a three-member board of
arbitration. One arbitrator is chosen by the claimant, one is chosen by
the alleged spillor, and one is a neutral member who is also the chairman.3 53 This neutral member is designated by the first two members.
If the designation is not made within ten days, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) makes the designation.3 5 4 If either party fails
to name an arbitrator within thirty days of the claim, the AAA will
choose all arbitrators.3 55 These arbitration proceedings are informal.3 58
The claimant waives all other remedies,' 5 7 and the Florida circuit
court in the circuit where the discharge occurred has jurisdiction for
immediate review.35
Once a settlement is reached, either by agreement or arbitration, the
claimant's award is paid from the Fund.35 9 If the total amount of proven
damages from all claimants exceeds the amount available in the Fund,
the claimants receive pro rata portions from the Fund.3 60 Even then,
since the Fund is absolutely liable to all proven costs and damages, the
claimants have the right to receive a pro rata share of all monies received by the Fund until all claims are satisfied.3 61
The Fund itself is reimbursed in a more complicated manner.
DNR, as administrator of the Fund, must seek reimbursement to the
Fund for any cost to the state for cleanup or damages;36 in addition,
individual claims paid by the Fund are subrogated to DNR.3 6 3 In the
subrogated action, DNR proves its damages by submitting to the court
a written record of all amounts paid or owed to claimants by the
Fund. 64 DNR then only needs to prove that the discharge giving rise
to the claims occurred 65 and the source thereof.
The defending owner and/or operators, however, are not absolutely
liable to the Fund. They may use the four common law defenses to
escape liability for damage and cost of cleanup.3 66 They can also limit
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 376.12(2)(b).
§ 376.12(3).
§ 376.12(3)(a).
§ 376.12(3)(b).
§ 376.12(2)(b).

358. Id. § 376.12(3)(c).
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 376.12(2)(a), (b) and (e).
§ 376.12(6).
§ 376.12(4).
§ 376.12(2)(d).
§ 376.12(4).
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their liability for the cleanup and abatement costs to the amount
established by the 1974 law. 36 7 If a vessel is involved, the limitation of
liability is the lesser of $14,000,000 or $100 per gross registered ton of
the discharging vessel, or $8,000,000 if a terminal facility has discharged the pollutant. 3' This limitation is fixed, unless DNR can prove
that the "discharge was the result of willful or gross negligence or
willful misconduct within the privity or knowledge of the owner or
operator."369 A defendant who has been grossly negligent or guilty of
37 0
willful misconduct cannot limit his liability.
Objectors to the 1974 law protested the limitation of liability provisions and argued that those who profit from the transportation of
pollutants should bear the full costs of oil spills as a part of the risk
of doing business.3 7 1 This criticism, though popular, is not realistic.
While it is true that oil companies and shippers profit from transporting pollutants and that their activity poses substantial threats to the
ecology, the shipping industry is not the only segment of society to
benefit from the transportation of oil. Modern society requires oil;
every member of society benefits from its transportation by sea. Surely
it is reasonable to expect society to accept responsibility for some of
the risks involved in order to meet its needs.
In addition, the 1974 law does not excuse a spillor's negligence or
management practices. Vessel and terminal facility operators and
owners under the Florida law escape liability for the cleanup costs of
a spill and the damage it causes only if its occurrence was completely
outside the spillor's control.372 Although the limited liability for
cleanup costs may not suffice for a large or catastrophic spill, it appears
more than adequate for the average spill in the light of modern
technology.373 Thus a spillor will be held responsible for the cleanup
costs of most spills. Any release from financial responsibility that a
vessel owner or operator might enjoy will probably be the result of
the Limitation of Liability Act.3 7'
Admittedly the transportation of pollutants by sea creates possibility
of extreme damage; government has the duty to provide some protection for society against the risks involved.375 The Florida Pollutant
367. Id. § 376.12(1).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See Sept. 11, 1973 Hearing, supra note 87, at 24-31 (testimony of Allen I.
Mendelsohn).
372. FLA. STAT. § 376.12(4) (1975).
373. See Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, supra note 253, at 355-59.
374. See Section IV supra.
375. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1968). See also FLA. STAT. § 376.021 (1975).
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Spill Prevention and Control Act of 1974 appears to meet this governmental obligation. Once there has been damage, the 1974 law provides
a ready source of funds to abate oil spills and facilitates recovery by
claimants of their damages.
The 1974 law has additional provisions designed to prevent pollution damage. DNR is empowered to adopt and enforce regulations
relating to discharges of pollutants into the waters or onto the coasts
of the state.37 6 It places terminal facilities under a licensing system that
requires compliance with state and federal plans and regulations for
abatement and control of spills. 3 77 The Florida statute provides for
a state response team which is responsible for the creation of a contingency plan of response, organization, and equipment for handling
emergency cleanup operations.1 8 The response team is to act independently of federal agencies, but is directed to cooperate with any
federal cleanup operation.37 9
Spillors are encouraged to comply with the provisions of the 1974
law by means other than the judicial enforcement of claims for damages.
The 1974 law imposes civil fines on anyone who does not comply with
all its requirements. Prohibited spills,380 failure to report a spill for
382
which that party is responsible,-" and failure to remove such a spill
are punishable by a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day during
which the offense occurs.3 13 The person in charge of a vessel or terminal
facility discharging a pollutant is guilty of a third degree felony if the
discharge is not reported to the nearest Coast Guard Station.3 8 4 The
vessel which reports the discharge must remain in the jurisdiction a
sufficient time for DNR to determine financial responsibility.8 5 The
pilot or master of a vessel who fails to remain in the jurisdiction for
a reasonable time after notice of a discharge is guilty of a third degree
felony.886
The 1974 Florida law is not without its problems. Fortunately,
there has not yet been a severe test of its mechanisms; no cataclysmic
disaster has occurred to test the procedures and thus reveal possible
faults.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

FLA. STAT. § 376.07 (1975).
Id. § 376.06.
Id. § 376.07(2)(e).
Id.
Id. § 376.041.
Id. § 376.07(2)(g).
Id. § 376.09(1).
Id. § 376.16(1).
Id. § 376.12(8).
Id.
Id.
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The application of the Limitation of Liability Act to the 1974
law is also uncertain.3 1T The 1974 Florida law still holds vessels liable
for cleanup costs up to $14,000,000 or $100 per gross registered ton,
whichever is less.388 In Askew v. American Waterways Operators,'9 the
Supreme Court did not address the propriety of the application of the
Limitation of Liability Act;3 90 future judicial review may further mitigate its harshness, negate its applicability, or nullify the sections which
limit liability on vessels.
While some legal issues remain to be settled, the Florida Pollutant
Spill Prevention and Control Act offers an appealing model for future
legislation in other states. A bill strongly resembling the Florida law
was introduced in 1975 in the United States Senate.3

91

Because the

year392

Senate bill died in committee that
leaving the states to enact
their own legislation, many states may wish they were in Florida's
position regarding oil spills: that of a legal entity which has experienced
a problem and has taken sensible, rational steps to provide for the
future.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
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See discussion in Section IV supra.
FLA. STAT. § 376.12 (1975).
411 U.S. 325 (1973).
Id. at 332.
S. 1754, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).
The bill was referred to the Commerce Committee, the Interior and Insular
Committee, and the Public Works Committee.

